the enemy to-morrow morning. Extra ammunition is being issued to the men to-night, and all will breakfast and be under arms before daylight.

Respectfully, &c.,

TH. J. WOOD,

Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Gordon's Mills, September 16, 1863-3.30 p. m.

Brigadier General J. A. GARFIELD,
Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: One of my scouts who went out yesterday afternoon and has just returned reports that from the best information he has been able to gain the bulk of the enemy's force is about La Fayette and in the vicinity. He says it is commonly understood that the enemy is not going to leave this region of country without a fight, and that great confidence is reposed in the strength of Pigeon Mountain for either offensive or defensive operations. He reports that it is said Buckner's force is at Shield's Gap, and that it is commonly said he is to attack and take Gordon's Mills. He says that Buckner's force is reported at 10,000 and that Bragg's whole force is reported at 50,000. He says Bragg, Polk, and Hill are reported to be in the neighborhood of La Fayette.

I send this information direct to department headquarters because they are nearer to me than corps headquarters are.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. J. WOOD,

Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Gordon's Mills, September 16, 1863.

Colonel C. G. HARKER,

Commanding Third Brigade:

COLONEL: I am directed by the commanding general of the division to address to you the following inquiries, and to request an answer to them during this forenoon:

First. Is or not the position at the junction of the Chattanooga and Nashville Railroad with the Chattanooga and Trenton Railroad (being the position in which the division was first halted in Lookout Valley, Sunday, the 6th instant) entirely open, capable of being attacked on all sides, in front, on both flanks, and in rear simultaneously, and hence a most injudicious and dangerous position in which an inferior force in numbers should receive an attack from a superior force?

Second. Did or not all the information gained during the afternoon of Sunday and during the earlier part of Sunday evening (the information being derived from citizens, from a prisoner captured by our pickets, inferentially form the activity of the enemy's signal operations during this time, and especially from our own pickets) go to show conclusively that we were in the immediate proximity of a