large hostile force, and indicated clearly the extreme probability of an attack in force by the enemy early the next morning?

Third. In view of the facts referred to in question second, was or was not, in your opinion, the change of position 1 1/2 miles to the rear during the night of Sunday, whereby a very strong, and defensible position was gained, eminently proper and judicious?

Fourth. In your opinion was the purpose for which the division was sent into Lookout Valley, namely, to reconnoiter and threaten the enemy, at all interfered with by the change of position; but, on the other hand, was not the purpose advanced by the change, inasmuch as the command gained a strong position from which it could not be forced by a sudden and violent assault, and being thus able to maintain itself could fully effect the object of its being sent into Lookout Valley?

Fifth. Considering the extreme proximity of a vastly preponderating force of the enemy, and the strong probability of an attack at any time, and considering also the extreme probability of Colonel Harker becoming severely engaged with a superior force in his reconnaissance, and the propriety of having the power of drawing him off successfully, were or not he precautions taken for getting the batteries and Buell's brigade strongly posted before Harker's brigade was launched on the reconnaissance absolutely demanded, and were they or not made with all possible expedition-in short, was or not he reconnaissance made at the earliest moment compatible with the safety of the command and the assurance of the success of the reconnaissance?

Sixth. In your judgment was or not everything accomplished by the reconnaissance that could have been achieved if it had moved at an earlier hour of the morning of the 7th?

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. P. BESTOW,

Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. THIRD BIRG., FIRST DIV., 21ST ARMY CORPS, Gordon's Mills, Ga., September 16, 1863.

Captain M. P. BESTOW,
Asst. Adjt. General, First Div., Twenty-first Army Corps:

SIR: In answer to certain questions propounded by the general commanding the First Division, Twenty-first Army Corps, in regard to the position, movements, &c., of this division of the 6th and 7th instant, I have the honor very respectfully to submit the following answers:

Answer to question 2. From the information of Sunday evening, the 6th instant, and from the isolated and untenable position of our troops (which must have been known by the enemy, as he could observe our number and position from his signal station), I believed at the time that an attack on Monday morning was quite probable.

Answer to question 3. In regard to the change of position, I re-