Our loss, as officially reported, is as follows:

Killed Wounded Missing Aggregate

Fourth Army 5 37 18 60

Corps: First

Division

Second Division 52 519 670 1,241

Artillery 10 51 6 67

Twenty-third 30 142 135 307

Army Corps:

Second Division

Third Division 48 185 97 330

72nd Regiment 10 62 86 158

Illinois

Volunteers

44th Regiment 34 37 92 163

Missouri

Volunteers

Total 189 1,033 1,104 2,326

I am not able at this time to give fully the names of the killed and wounded officers. Among the latter is Major-General Stanley, commanding the Fourth Corps, who was severely wounded in the neck while gallantly urging forward his troops to regain the portion of our line which had been lost. General Stanley is deserving of special commendation, and has my hearty thanks for his cordial support and wise counsel throughout the short but eventful campaign. Brigadier General J. D. Cox, commanding temporarily the Twenty-third Corps, deserves a very large share of credit for the brilliant victory at Franklin. The troops were placed in position and entrenched under his immediate direction, and the greater portion of the line engaged was under his command during the battle. I recommend General Cox to the special consideration of the Government. Brigadier-General Ruger, commanding Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, held the weakest portion of our line, and that upon which the enemy's assaults were most persistent. He is entitled to very great credit. Brigadier-General Reilly, commanding [temporarily] the Third Division, Twenty-third Corps, maintained his lines with perfect firmness, and captured twenty battle-flags along his parapet. I am also under great obligations to the division commanders of the Fourth Army Corps, Brigadier-Generals Wood, Wagner, and Kimball, for the admirable manner in which they discharged every duty, and cannot refrain from expressing my high commendation, though in advance of the official report of their immediate commander. Colonel Emerson Opdycke, commanding First Brigade, Second Division, Fourth Army Corps, the reserve which recaptured the lost portion of our line, is spoken of by Generals Stanley and Cox as having displayed on that occasion the highest qualities of a commander. I cordially indorse their recommendation. For other special instances of gallantry and good conduct I must refer to subordinate reports.

On my arrival at Franklin I gained the first information from General Wilson since the enemy commenced his advance from Duck River. I learned that he had been driven back and had crossed the Harpeth above Franklin on the preceding day, leaving my left and rear entirely open to the enemy's cavalry. By my direction he sent General Hatch's division forward again, on the Lewisburg pike, to hold Forrest in check until my trains and troops could reach Franklin. This was successfully done, and General Hatch then retired before a superior force, and recrossed the river, connecting with my infantry pickets on the north bank, early in the afternoon. A short time before the infantry attack commenced the enemy's cavalry forced a crossing about three miles above Franklin, and drove back our cavalry, for a time seriously threatening our trains, which were accumulating on the north bank, and moving toward Nashville. I sent General Wilson orders, which he had, however, anticipated, to drive the enemy back at all hazards, and moved a brigade of General Wood's division to support him, if necessary. At the moment of the first decisive repulse of the enemy's infantry I received the most gratifying intelligence that General Wilson had driven the rebel cavalry back across the river. This rendered my immediate left and rear secure for the time being. Previous to the battle of the 30th I had ordered all trains except ammunition and hospital wagons to Nashville, preparatory to falling back from Franklin when it should become necessary, which I expected on the following day. The enemy having nearly double my force of infantry and quite double my cavalry, could easily turn any position I might take and seriously endanger my rear.

Only one division of the enemy's cavalry had been engaged with General Wilson during the 30th. The remaining three divisions were free to strike my line of communications, which they could easily do about Brentwood by daylight the next morning. My experience on the 29th, had shown how utterly inferior in force my cavalry was to that of the enemy, and that even my immediate flank and rear were insecure, while my communication with Nashville was entirely without protection I could not even rely upon getting up the ammunition necessary for another battle.