To remain longer at Franklin was to seriously hazard the loss of my army, by giving the enemy another chance to cut me off from re-enforcements, which he had made three desperate though futile attempts to accomplish. I had detained the enemy long enough to enable you to concentrate your scattered troops at Nashville, and had succeed i inflicting upon him very heavy losses, which was the primary object. I had found it impossible to detain him long enough to get re-enforcements at Franklin. Only a small portion of the infantry and none of the cavalry could reach me in time to be of any use in the battle, which must have been fought on the 1st of December. For these reasons, after consulting with the corps and division commanders, and obtaining your approval, I determined to retire during the night of the 30th toward Nashville. The artillery was withdrawn to the north bank during the early part of the night, and at 12 o'clock the army withdrew from its trenches and crossed the rive without loss. During the next day, December 1, the whole army was placed in position in front of Nashville.

Information obtained since the above report was written, and principally since the reoccupation of Franklin by our troops, makes the enemy's loss 1,750 buried upon the field, 3,800 disabled and placed in hospitals in Franklin, and 702 prisoners, making 6,252 of the enemy placed hors de combat, besides the slightly wounded. The enemy's loss in general officers was very great, being 6 killed, 6 wounded, and 1 captured. It is to be observed that more than half of our loss occurred in General Wagner's division of the Fourth Corps, which did not form part of the main line of defense. This loss arose in two brigades of that division from their remaining in front of the line after their proper duty as outposts had been accomplished, and after they should have taken their positions in reserve, and in the other brigade [Colonel Opdycke's] in its hand-to-hand encounter with the enemy over the portion of the parapet which had been temporarily lost by the precipitate retreat of the other two brigades. When it became apparent that we should have to fall back from Columbia, orders to rejoin the army were sent to General Cooper, commanding the troops guarding the crossings of Duck River below Columbia at Centreville, both by myself and the major-general commanding, which were obeyed as soon as received, and General Cooper marched for Franklin. Owing to delays in receiving his orders and the time necessary to concentrate his troops, General Cooper could not reach Franklin before its occupation by the enemy, and turned his column direct for Nashville. Arrived at the Brentwood Hills by the Charlotte pike on the night of December 2, and again found the enemy between him and the army. He then marched to Clarksville, where he arrived in safety on the 5th and rejoined my command on the 8th of December. General Cooper deserves great credit for the skill and judgment displayed in conducting his retreat.

BATTLES OF THE 15TH AND 16TH OF DECEMBER IN FRONT OF NASHVILLE.

My command consisted of the Second and Third Divisions of the Twenty-third Army Corps, commanded, respectively, by Major General D. N. Couch and Brigadier General J. D. Cox. The effective strength of each division was about 3,500 men. Previous to the battle the corps occupied the line of defense from Block House Casino to the Nolensville pike, including Fort Negley.

According to the plan of battle, as modified on the evening of the 14th, my troops were to be relieved by Major-General Steedman's at dawn of day in the morning, pass in rear of General Wood's corps, and take position in reserve near the right to support the attack on the enemy's left. The movement commenced at daylight a ordered. General Couch's division debouched from our works on the Hardin pike and formed in rear of General Smith's left, and General Cox's, save one