somewhat collected, and Lieutenant-General Lee took command of the rear guard, campaign for the night in that vicinity. On leaving the field I sent a staff officer to inform General Forrest of our defeat and to direct him to rejoin the army, with as little delay as possible, to protect its rear; but owing to the swollen condition of the creeks, caused by the heavy rain then falling, he was unable to join until we reached Columbia, with the exception of a portion of his command which joined while the army was moving from Franklin to Spring Hill.

On the 17th we continued our retreat toward Columbia, camping for the night on Spring Hill. During this day's march the enemy's cavalry pressed with great boldness and activity, charging our infantry repeatedly with the saber, and a few times going through our lines. The country, being open, was favorable for their operations. I regret to say, also, on this day, that Lieutenant-General Lee was [wounded] severely in the foot. We continued our retreat across the Duck River to Columbia, the corps alternating as rear guards to the army. While at Columbia Major-General Forrest rejoined.

After the fight at Nashville I at first hoped to have been able to remain in Tennessee on the line of the Duck River; but after arriving at Columbia I became convinced that the condition of the army made it necessary to recross the Tennessee River without delay; and on the 21st the army resumed the march for Pulaski, leaving Major-General Forrest, with the cavalry, and Major-General Walthall, with Ector's, Strahl's, Maney's, Granbury's, and Palmer's infantry brigades, at Columbia as a rear guard.* From Pulaski I moved by the most direct route to the Bainbridge crossing on the Tennessee River, which we reached on the 25th of December, and our pontoon was completed at daylight on the 26th, when the army crossed as rapidly as possible, the whole having crossed on the 27th, including the rear guard, which the enemy followed with all his cavalry and three corps of infantry to Pulaski, but only with cavalry between Pulaski and the Tennessee River. Since crossing the river I have moved the army by easy marches to this place. After recrossing the Tennessee our pontoon and supply trains were ordered at once to the vicinity of Columbus, Miss., by the most direct route, that the animals might be more easily foraged, and while on the march they were pressed by a small body of the enemy's cavalry, and owing to the inefficiency of Brigadier-General Roddey's cavalry were overtaken and the pontoon train and a small portion of the supply train destroyed.

My reasons for having made the campaign are as follows: After the fall of Atlanta this army was, consequent therefrom, in position upon the plains, all the mountain fastness having been given up from Dalton to the Chattahoochee River. I did not feel able to keep General Sherman from advancing to Macon or Augusta and continuing his line of block-houses as a thorough protection to his communications, and feeling that the morale of the army was such as to require some change of position, I resolved to move to his rear and force him to fall back with his entire army to Chattanooga, or divide his forces and attempt to move with one wing to the Atlantic and the other to Tennessee, thereby giving me the chance of crushing one part of his army. General Sherman did divide his army, and moved upon Savannah with four corps, and Thomas with the remainder to Tennessee. I hoped and expected our people to have harassed, and in a great measure destroyed,

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* But see composition of infantry rear guard, as reported by Walthall, p. 726.

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