that portion moving to the coast, while I attempted to destroy Thomas and gain Nashville, and thereby large re-enforcements and all kinds of supplies for the army. Sherman, however, succeeded in marching to Savannah with but little annoyance, and we failed to gain Nashville, and have been forced to fall back to the prairies of Mississippi. I regard, however, our situation far better in having the grand army of the Federals divided, with one wing in Tennessee and one in Savannah, than to have had their entire force now lying in the heard of Georgia upon the great railroad, to us, running from the east to the west, with the Army of Tennessee in line of battle, with their backs upon the cane-brake country of Alabama in order to subsist, and General Sherman and the army now under Thomas between General Lee and myself.

I have not as yet required the reports of subordinate commanders; will forward them as soon as received.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD,

General.

General G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Commanding Military Division of the West.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
Montgomery, Ala., January 9, 1865.

Respectfully forwarded to the War Department for its information.

The plan of campaign into Middle Tennessee was correct as originally designed by General Hood, and if carried out without modification would have compelled General Sherman to return to Middle Tennessee to protect and repair his lines of communication before he could have collected enough supplies to march his army from Atlanta to the sea-coast. But instead of crossing the Tennessee River at Guntersville, as General Hood intended at Gadsden, he changed his course while on the march and repaired to Tuscumbia and Florence, where the want of supplies, due to the bad condition of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads, and the non-arrival of additional cavalry, delayed his offensive movement three weeks, thereby enabling General Sherman to repair the damages done to the Atlanta and Chattanooga Railroad and to collect sufficient supplies for his march across Georgia. This report being only a synopsis of the operations of the Army of Tennessee, unaccompanied by any sub-reports, I am unable yet to express my opinion as to the causes of its failure. It is clear to my mind, however, that after the great loss of life at Franklin the army was no longer in a condition to make a successful attack on Nashville - a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being re-enforced constantly by river and railroads. From Franklin General Hood should have marched, not on Nashville, but on Murfreesborough, which could doubtless have been captured, with its garrison of about 8,000 men; and after having destroyed the railroad bridges across Duck and Elk Rivers, which would doubtless have caused the evacuation of Bridgeport and Chattanooga, he could have retired, with the prestige of success, into winter quarters behind the Duck or Tennessee Rivers, as circumstances might have dictated.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General.