run to that point with the locomotive, where he could get a supply of water, and return in time to take the train to Okolona by 6 a. m. This proposition I submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, and it met with his sanction. The locomotive was detached, and I went on it to Okolona to get all the information that I could as regarded the whereabouts of the enemy, their strength, &c., as I had been able to hear nothing since leaving West Point, though I had instructed Major Wheeler, commandant of post, to send a courier five miles down the railroad to give me any information that he might have of the enemy. No courier was dispatched along eh line of the railroad. I arrived at Okolona at 4.30 a. m., and was here informed that the enemy were encamped within five miles of the place, estimated at from 2,000 to 2,500 strong by the most reliable scouts that came in. Okolona being in a broad, open prairie, affording no protection for infantry, and finding that it could be approached by three roads, I thought it best not to attempt any defense of that place. I then for he first time learned that General Gholson was in front of the enemy with a cavalry command, reported to me to be 190 strong, without ammunition. I sent a courier to him immediately, telling him what disposition I thought best to make of the troops under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, and asking a personal interview with him. I waited one hour, receiving no reply from General Gholson. It being then about the dawn of day, and not knowing how soon the enemy would be in the town, and not receiving any reports from the scouts, I caused to be moved about fourteen cars that were at the depot to Egypt, which I was informed by the railroad agent were of more value to the company than the defense of the track from that point to Egypt. Had those trains not been removed at that time they would have certainly fallen into the hands of the enemy. I returned to Egypt on this train, where I reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Burke all the information I had been able to get, adn what I had written to General Gholson relative to the best disposition I thought to make of the troops, all of which met with the approval of Lieutenant-Colonel Burke. Two hundred and seventy men were moved up on train and placed in position on railroad two miles and a half south of Okolona, where there was a bridge and trestle that could be defended by infantry, that being the only point where there was any timber or cover on the prairie close to the railroad. The train was sent to report to Lieutenant-Colonel burke, commanding these 270 men, to enable him to fall back on Egypt should the enemy make any demonstration on either flank, at that time having heard nothing from General Gholson. At 9.30 a. m. General Gholson came in person to where the 270 men were in position, and he was informed by Lieutenant-Colonel Burke and myself of the disposition that had been made of the infantry. General Gholson then informed me that he had 250 cavalry, with which he could and was watching the movements of the enemy, and would keep me posted as to their movements, but could make no resistance, as he had not one round of ammunition for his command. At about 11.30 a. m. the enemy were in Okolona, and General Gholson's command fell back on the position of Lieutenant-Colonel Burke. I was at this time in Egypt making disposition of forces, as directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Burke. Lieutenant-Colonel Burke fell back on Egypt that evening, and all the troops were placed in position to defend the railroad at that place. At 10.30 o'clock that night the operator informed me that General Gardner wished to communicate with me at the telegraph office-General Gardner being then at West Point, and I at Egypt. He inquired of me the disposition that had been made of the forces and the where-