abouts of the enemy. I telegraphed him fully of the condition of everything at that point. He replied that he would send up immediately 500 infantry, with the supplies needed, on the train. I then telegraphed him, setting forth the importance of the troops being in Egypt at 5.30 o'clock on the morning of the 28th; that General Gholson would be useless with his cavalry, as they had no ammunition; their guns being caliber .54, and the ammunition drawn at this place was caliber .58, the ammunition would not fit his guns, consequently could not be supplied by me. There was, however, found one box of ammunition, caliber .54, which was given by Lieutenant-Colonel Burke to General Gholson on the evening of the 27th. I then telegraphed to General Gardner that I though it important to keep the train of cars at Egypt, as the enemy was camped about three miles north of that place, and there was no chance for the escape of these men, should they be overpowered by the enemy, except by this railroad train. Inclosed, marked B, I send his telegraphic reply.

From that moment I gave the train over to the charge of the railroad agent, who was then in the telegraph office, instructing him to leave off several hundred pounds of beef and one sack of salt, as the men were then without rations. I was informed by the railroad agent, whose name I do not remember to have ever heard, that he would move this train to West Point on the arrival of the train from West Point, which he supposed would be there about 5 a. m. 28th.

The last telegram that I received from General Gardner was about 12 o'clock that night. At about 3 a. m. I agian telegraphed General Gardner, teeing him the importance of the 500 troops and ammunition being there by 5.30 o'clock to enable me to supply General Gholson with ammunition. The operator at West Point replied that the train had left half an hour before, but that General Gardner was not aboard. The distance being eighteen miles, I thought it safe to calculate that it would arrive at Egypt by 5.30 o'clock. What detained it I am unable to state.

The fight commenced in Egypt about 7.30 o'clock. I at that time was at the railroad train, half a mile south of Egypt. The enemy moved between Egypt and train; at the same moment charged it with another column. The attempt was made to move this whole train, but it was found that here was not a sufficiency of steam or power to move the whole train and save it from capture by the enemy, who were then within lean than 300 yards of the train. There was a number of cars cut off from the train, which enabled the locomotive to move forward and make good its escape with the remainder of the train-several box-cars and flat-cars, which were loaded with King's battery. How many cars were cut off I am unable to state positively, but, my impression is that here were seven or eight. I found that it was impossible to impress horses for King's battery. King's battery was on these platform-cars and fired repeatedly into the charging columns of the enemy. About 8.30 o'clock, the train still not having arrived from West Point, I concluded that the locomotive must have been off the track, and moved this train up for the purpose of loading the soldiers from one train on to the other, to enable me, if possible, to re-enforce Lieutenant-Colonel Burke at Egypt. We met the other train a distance of four and a half or five miles from Egypt. The enemy were then within one mile and a half of the train. The infantry, commanded by Colonel Wier, was immediately formed and moved up the line of the railroad, where they encountered the enemy about one mile from where they got off the cars, in which they repulsed the enemy; this being