small, as the duty for which the brigade was ordered was to guard a point some 6 miles below Brown's Ferry. The brigade could not be re-enforced, as the enemy's Moccasin batteries commanded the only road across the mountain. If it had been practicable to re-enforce, I should not have thought myself authorized to do so by taking my troops that were occupying their proper positions in the line of investment for that purpose, as my orders and the disposition of my troops had no reference to any such move on the part of the enemy, and to have done so would have broken our line and exposed the whole army. Besides, the enemy's position was such that he could re-enforce from any point of his lines in half an hour, while I could only re-enforce from my nearest point in about 3 hours. He would have the benefit of his artillery, and we could not cross the mountain with ours.

On the 27th, I received orders to make arrangements and examinations for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from his new position, and with that view was called to meet the commanding general on the mountain on the following day.

On the afternoon of the 27th, I received a report from my signal party near Trenton that the enemy was advancing in force from Bridgeport. I sent this information up to the commanding general, but as it was not confirmed by the cavalry it was not credited.

On the 28th, I met the commanding general on the mountain in accordance with his appointment. While engaged in an examination of the enemy's new position, one of my signal party reported to us that the enemy was advancing in force from Bridgeport. He guided us to a projection on the mountain about a mile off, where we saw the head of the enemy's column, and where we saw his force [about 5,000] file past and unite with the force already at Brown's Ferry. The rear guard of this command [about 1,500, with a battery of artillery] came up in about an hour and halted about 3 miles from the main force. The road between the two commands ran along the western base of a series of heights, and parallel to them. The position that had been taken by General Law's brigade was about a mile from this road. and opposite the point of the road, about half way between the rear guard and the main force.

As soon as the rear guard halted I sent orders to General Jenkins to concentrate at the base of the mountain his three brigades that were on the east side, and to be ready to cross it as soon as it was dark enough to conceal our men from the fire of the enemy's batteries and I directed that he should report to me upon the mountain at once. I also ordered General Law to advance his brigade as soon as it was dark and occupy the height in his immediate front, which commanded the road between the enemy's forces.

General Jenkins reported in time to see the positions occupied by the enemy. He was ordered to hold the point designated for General Law with a sufficient force, while a portion of his command moved up the road and captured or dispersed the rear guard. He was also directed, if time and circumstances favored it, to make a demonstration against the main force, and if an attack at night should give us such advantage as to warrant it, to endeavor to drive the enemy across the river; but if the latter should appear inexpedient, to recross the mountain before daylight.

As soon as it was dark his troops were put in motion, but the