route across the point of the mountain was so difficult that he was not able to get his troops into their positions until midnight. He arranged two brigades under General Law to hold the position between the enemy's force, while his own brigade, under Colonel Bratton, was sent to make the attack upon the rear guard. His fourth brigade [General Benning's] was held on the left of General Law's two in readiness to re-enforce Colonel Bratton. The brigade under Colonel Bratton claims to have had complete success up to the moment that it was recalled. It was recalled in consequence of General Law's abandoning his position, which was essential to the safety of Colonel Bratton's command.

As soon as General Law yielded his position it became necessary to recall Colonel Bratton and send the troops back to their positions, in order that they might pass the mountain before daylight. The loss sustained by the two brigades under General Law was probably one-tenth of the loss sustained by the single brigade which claims a victory. As General Law's troops were veterans, I can only attribute the want of conduct with his troops to a strong feeling of jealousy among the brigadier-generals.

About 8 o'clock at night on the 28th, I received notice that the commanding general had approved my plan, and information from him that another of my divisions had been relieved from the lines and could be used in this attack, but it was too late for it to cross the mountain before daylight, and the success of the affair depended entirely upon a night attack and a surprise. To have put two divisions on the west side of the mountain during daylight would have exposed them to an attack from the enemy's entire force without artillery, and in a position where they could not be re-enforced. My object was merely to inflict such damage upon the enemy as might be accomplished by a surprise. That the point was not essential to the enemy at Chattanooga is established by the fact that he supplied his army at that place some six weeks without it.

About October 31, Lieutenant-General Hardee, Major-General Breckinridge, and myself were ordered to examine this position with a view to a general battle. It was decided that an attack was impracticable; that the only route by which our troops could reach the field was a difficult mountain road, only practicable for infantry and entirely exposed to the enemy's batteries on the other side of the river. His positions were connected by a short and easy route, while ours would have been separated by a mountain, impassable to artillery except by a detour of some 50 miles, and hardly practicable for infantry. Our position was so faulty that we could not accomplish that which was hoped for. We were trying to starve the enemy out by investing him on the only side from which he could not have gathered supplies.

Copies* of communications connected with this matter are appended to this report. The reports of the subordinate officers have already been forwarded.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES LONGSTREET,

Lieutenant-General.

Colonel GEORGE WILLIAM BRENT,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

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*Not found.

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