*HEADQUARTERS, December 25, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded.

The orders in this case were as stated by General Jenkins. The troops that he was to operate against were seen and carefully considered by General Bragg and myself. I put the force down at 5,000 at the outside. General Bragg without hesitation put it at a less figure. That is the force which marched down Lookout Valley toward Brown's Ferry. A force of about 1,500 men and a battery and a few wagons followed this force and encamped about 3 miles in rear of the main force. This was evidently the rear guard, and this was the force which I hoped to be able to cut off, surprise, and capture. The dispositions and movements of the forces, as mentioned by General Jenkins, were ordered by me. The division by its figures should have mustered 5,000 men [Hood's division]. The force that we were to operate against was parts of the Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps. These troops have more notoriety for their want of steadiness under fire than for anything else.

As they were marched down Lookout Valley a part of their force came under the fire of one of our batteries. About the third shot from a Parrott gun threw the line back in some confusion. Taking into consideration the condition of the enemy and the peculiar nature of the ground, I speedily arranged the plan mentioned by General Jenkins and ordered the movements. The ridge on his map marked A' B'', instead of being a continuous ridge as there represented, is a succession of what woodsmen call hogbacks, about 300 yards in length. The one at B was to be held by the brigades in position, while the enemy's rear guard was attached and captured or dispersed. The officers do not seem to have appreciated a night attack. It should have been made with great vigor and promptness, and completed before the enemy could have time to know our purposes. When the order was given it was supposed by myself that it would be executed by 12 o'clock at latest. Had we succeeded in that time we should have been in good condition to follow up the first repulse of the enemy by General Law, and probably greatly discomfited the force at Brown's Ferry.

The reports of General Jenkins and General Law conflict, each apparently claiming that the other was at fault. Considerable stress seems to be placed upon the report of the prisoner who, after being captured, reported that part of the Twelfth Corps had encamped a little distance back just before night. This was the force seen by many officers, and estimated by all as already stated. I endeavored to impress upon the minds of the officers the fact that one musket at night would make more noise than fifty during the day. The only real weak point about us was the jealousy between the two brigades already mentioned. This I considered, and with a momentary doubt about the propriety of executing the plan, but concluded after a moment's hesitation that my troops were so steady that they would hardly require commanders after they were once in position. The plan was very simple and very strong. Had we been able to execute promptly, or had Law pressed his advantage after the first or second repulse of the enemy, we should have had a great success at a very light cost and trouble.

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*Indorsement on the report of Brig. General M. Jenkins, commanding Hood's division, of the affair at Lookout Mountain, October 28, 1863. Jenkins' report not found.

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