not know where General Bragg is, I must ask you to send him the report for his remarks. I have not been able to have a map of the topography of the country. I shall endeavor to send you one as soon as it can be obtained.

I remain, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JAMES LONGSTREET,

Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS,
Russellville, East Tennessee, January 1, 1864.

GENERAL: About November 1, a camp rumor reached me to the effect that I was to be ordered into East Tennessee, to operate against the enemy's forces at and near Knoxville. Such a move had not occurred to me previously as practicable. I therefore set to work to fix upon some plan by which it might be executed. After two days' reflection I concluded the move might be made with safety by withdrawing our army behind the Chickamauga to some strong position, at the same time withdrawing our forces then at Sweetwater, so as to give out the impression that we were concentrating behind the Chickamauga, but at the same time to make a rapid movement by the most the enemy so suddenly and so severely that his force should be crushed before he could know anything of our purposes; then to retire to meet the enemy at Chattanooga, or, better, to operate rapidly against his rear and flank. The reason for retiring behind the Chickamauga with our main force was, that our extended line being so near the enemy would enable him to concentrate and march against any point of it in twenty minutes after leaving his works.

The day after arriving at this conclusion (November 3) I was called to council by the commanding general, with Lieutenant-General Hardee and Major-General Breckinridge. The subject of the movements of our army being called, campaigns were proposed and discussed, and pronounced by those familiar with the country as impracticable, owing to the scarcity of supplies in the country. The campaign in East Tennessee was then discussed, and I proposed the plan that I have already mentioned.

A campaign was settled upon. Two divisions (McLaws' and Hood's), under my command, were spoken of as the force from Chattanooga to execute it. I repeated my apprehensions about our lines thus weakened remaining so near the enemy's works, but failed to make any impression upon the minds of the other officers, and endeavored to explain that the force that I would have would be too weak to operate with that promptness which the occasion seemed to require. At the end of the consultation I was ordered verbally to begin my preparations for the campaign.

After reaching my headquarters I gave orders for the withdrawal of Alexander's battalion of artillery at once, and ordered General McLaws to withdraw his division after night; these commands to march the following day to Tyner's Station, to take the cars for Sweet Water. Leyden's artillery was withdrawn the next day, and Hood's division the following night. Leyden's artillery and Hood's division were ordered to meet the cars at the tunnel through Missionary Ridge. I applied at general headquarters for maps and information about the country that I was to operate in; also for a quartermaster and commissary of subsistence who knew the resources of the country,