and an engineer officer who had been serving on Major-General Buckner's staff at Knoxville. None of the staff officers asked for were sent me,nor were any of the maps, except one of the country between the Hiwassee and Tennessee Rivers. Major-General Buckner was kind enough to give me some inaccurate maps of the country along the Holston-all that he had. The best one a map of roads and rivers only.

There was much delay in getting the troops up to Sweet Water by rail. As I had no control over this transportation I could apply no remedy further than to make details from my command to assist wherever aid was needed. Letters from the commanding general's headquarters seemed to urge upon me the importance of prompt movements in a spirit which appeared to intimate that the delays which had occurred were due to some neglect of mine, or some want of appreciation on my part, of the importance of prompt and energetic action. As I had urged from the moment the campaign was proposed the importance of such action, I thought that I ought not to have been urged on in such a tone, particularly as all of the delays that had occurred were upon the railroad over which I had no control. Hence my letter of the 11th, in answer to Lieutenant Ellis' of the 9th. I mentioned this not as an excuse for the letter, but in palliation of it.

Major-General Stevenson, who had been in command of our forces at Sweet Water, told me with entire confidence in his information that the enemy's forces were 23,000. This information he had also sent to General Bragg. This I now believe to be a correct statement of the enemy's force under General Burnside upon his entrance into East Tennessee. He also informed me that he had not been advised of my move, and so far from being ordered to have rations or supplies for us, he was ordered to send everything of the kind to the army of Chattanooga.

As my orders were to drive the enemy out of East Tennessee, or, if possible, capture him, I determined that the only possible chance of succeeding in either or both was to move and act as though I had a sufficient force to do either. I endeavored, therefore, to do as I should have done had the 20,000 men that I asked for been given me. Had the means been at hand for making the proper moves I should have marched for the rear of Knoxville via Morganton and Maryville, and gained possession of the heights there by forced marches. My transportation was so limited, however, that I could not spare a wagon to haul the pontoons for our bridge. The only move that I could make under the circumstances was by crossing the river where the cars delivered the bridge-Loudon.

On the night of November 13, Major-General Wheeler was detached with three of his brigades of cavalry, with orders to surprise a cavalry force of the enemy at Maryville (reported to be a brigade), capture it, and move on to the rear of Knoxville and endeavor to get possession of some of the heights on the south side, and to hold them until our arrival, or failing in this, to threaten the enemy at Knoxville, so as to prevent his concentrating his forces against us before we reached Knoxville. He surprised the force at Maryville (only about 400 strong), captured a part, and dispersed the balance of it. He moved on to Knoxville and failed to get possession of any of the heights which commanded the town, but created the diversion in my favor.

His other brigade, under Colonel Hart, was sent down to Kingston