as soon as we crossed the river, with orders to break up any force that the enemy might have there, and to leave a regiment there on picket. The balance of the brigades was ordered to return to our column and advance to Campbell's station, in front of General McLaws' division. After making the diversion at Knoxville, General Wheeler was ordered to retire and rejoin us by crossing the Holston on our right flank.

Colonel Alexander, chief of artillery, and Major Clarke, chief engineer, were sent to select a point where we could make a crossing in front of the enemy, that being the only place to which we could transport the bridge. Fortunately a very good point was found near Loudon at Huff's Ferry the day before the troops got up. Most of the troops being up on the 12th, the order to advance on the 13th at daylight was issued. The troops then in rear came up during the night of the 12th, and these moved forward to join us as soon as they could cook their rations. The head of the column was halted near Loudon beyond the enemy's view during the day, and the cars with the pontoons were stopped out of sight till after night. A select detail was made to throw across the river in advance, and details were made to roll the cars up to the nearest point of the river as soon as dark came on. At dark the cars were pushed up and the boats were taken down to the river as quietly as possible, with the hope that we might surprise and capture the enemy's pickets on the opposite bank. The information that we got from our cavalry pickets not being accurate, we failed in the effort. The picket escaped and gave the alarm, but the enemy did not attempt to molest us.

The night of the 13th and 14th was occupied in laying the bridge and in crossing.

In the afternoon of the 14th a considerable infantry force advanced and skirmished with us for some time, driving in our line of sharpshooters and deploying along our front as if to give battle.

Upon moving out on the morning of the 15th the enemy was found to be retiring. The sharpshooters of Hood's division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Logan, after a brisk skirmish drove in the enemy's rear in some confusion, he taking up his line of retreat along the road which follows the railroad. Not having a map of the topography of the country, I was of necessity dependent upon such information as I could get from the guides and from my own observation. I found that the enemy in retiring to his line of retreat had crossed a considerable ridge, which runs parallel with the railroad,and is impassable to vehicles except at certain gaps. Putting a small force at the pass over which the enemy retired, I advanced along the west side of the ridge on a road running parallel with the ridge and to the road by which the enemy must retire.

Arriving opposite Lenoir's Station I found a picket guard of the enemy at a gap in the ridge. After a little examination I found the enemy at Lenoir's in considerable force and taken completely by surprise, thinking that our force immediately in his rear was the only force that was advancing. With confident hope of reaping the full benefit of this surprise I moved down upon him. The ground was so muddy and the hills so high (almost mountains) that we were not able to get one division up and in position till after night. Some of the troops were sent under guides after night to get possession of the roads in the enemy's rear, and about midnight General Jenkins advanced his brigade and got possession of the only ground that the enemy could expect to occupy to give battle.