When daylight came it was found that the guides had failed to put the troops upon the right road, and that the enemy had during the night abandoned part of his wagon train and made a hurried retreat. Hood's division was put in pursuit, and McLaws' division, being on the road to Campbell's Station, was ordered to move forward as rapidly as possible and endeavor to intercept the enemy (in full retreat) at Campbell's Station. Jenkins' sharpshooters pursued rapidly,skirmishing nearly all of the time and making every effort to force the enemy to make a stand, but did not succeed in doing so until after he had passed Campbell's Station. He escaped General McLaws also and took a strong position east of Campbell's Station. As soon as General McLaws got up he was ordered to deploy three of his brigades in front of the enemy, and to put his other brigade upon a ridge on our left, so as to threaten the enemy's right.

At the same time Colonel Alexander put his artillery in position, and General Jenkins was ordered with Hood's division around the enemy's left, and upon arriving opposite the enemy's position to make an attack upon that flank, while General McLaws was advancing against the enemy's front to follow Jenkins' attack. The flank movement and fire of our batteries caused the enemy to retreat in some haste. McLaws' division advanced promptly and brought the enemy to a stand about a mile farther toward his rear in a more commanding position. If General Jenkins could have made his attack during this movement, or if he could have made it after the enemy had taken his second position, we must have destroyed this force, recovered East Tennessee, and in all probability captured the greater portion of the enemy's forces. He attributes his failure to do so to some mismanagement of General Law. Before I could get a staff officer to him to ascertain the occasion of the delay night came on and our efforts ceased. The enemy drew off as soon as it was dark and retired to Knoxville.

We advanced again at daylight, but only came up with the enemy's rear guard of cavalry. There was more or less skirmishing with this force until our line of skirmishers and our advanced battery came under the fire from the enemy's fort at the northwest angle of his lines at Knoxville. His line of skirmishers was about 1,000 yards in front of his works. General McLaws' skirmishers engaging them, Hart's brigade of cavalry was ordered over to the Clinton road to drive in the skirmishers of the enemy, and as soon as Hood's division came up it was ordered over to that road, and Hart's cavalry was sent on to the Tazewell road, so as to prevent as far as possible the escape of the enemy. I rode over to the Clinton road to make an examination of the country and select some position for Hood's division before night.

The next day, on riding to General McLaws' front, I found that the enemy's pickets occupied the same ground that they held the day before, and that his line had been strengthened during the night by making a defense of rails. Colonel Alexander was ordered to use his guns against this defense, and succeeded once or twice in driving the enemy off from some points of it; but our skirmishers did not move up to occupy it, and the enemy returned to it. I finally ordered General McLaws to order his troops up to take the position. Part of the troops moved up handsomely and got partial possession; others faltered and sought shelter under a rise of the ground, when Captain Winthrop, of Colonel Alexander's staff, appreciating the danger of delay at such a moment, mounted his horse and dashing up to