the front of our line led the troops over the work. He had the misfortune to receive a severe wound in this affair. Our force was not strong enough to risk an assault from so great a distance from the enemy's works. He had as many as we in a strong position fortified. We went to work, therefore, to make our way forward by gradual and less hazardous measures, at the same time making examinations of the enemy's entire positions.

General Wheeler retired from Knoxville and crossed the Holston near Louisville and joined us on the 18th. His three brigades were stationed on the Tazewell road, and Hart's brigade was sent back to Kingston, where a brigade of the enemy's cavalry was reported to be. Our transportation being limited we had brought no tools for intrenching or other work, except those that our small pioneer parties had. We were so fortunate, however, as to capture a large number of picks and spades in the abandoned wagons of the enemy at Lenoir's Station; also a pontoon bridge in the river near that place. We had the tools brought up by our cavalry upon their horses, and set to work to strengthen our position and make advances by throwing our picket lines forward at night. The enemy's line along General Jenkins' front seemed very weak and his entire line very long.

Upon an examination of his line on the 20th, on the Clinton road, General Jenkins thought that he might push in his skirmishers and find the means of breaking the enemy's line. He was ordered to advance his skirmishers a little before night, and to have his command ready, and if the opportunity proved favorable to throw his entire force upon the enemy and break his line. A little after dark he reported the matter impracticable. Our line was then about 700 yards from the enemy's. After careful examination I became convinced that the true key to the enemy's position was by the heights on the south side of the Holston, and crossed a small force (Laws' and Robertson's brigades) in flat-boats and obtained possession of one of the heights near and opposite the lower end of the enemy's line. This position gave us command of the fort and line in front of General McLaws, but the range from the hill to the fort was too great for our limited supply of ammunition. With a view to operations on a more extensive scale on the south side, the pontoon bridge that we had captured was ordered up. Our first effort was to get it up by the river, but that was reported impracticable, as there were rapids that the boats could not be hauled over. We were, therefore, obliged to send wagons to haul the bridge.

On the 22nd, General McLaws seemed to think his line near enough for an assault, and he was ordered to make it at dark on that night. General Jenkins was ordered to be prepared to co-operate. After night General McLaws reported against the assault, saying that this officers would prefer to attack by daylight.

On the 23rd instant [?], Major-General Wheeler, in conformity with instructions, moved upon Kingston with three brigades of cavalry.

A portion of the next day was passed in skirmishing with the enemy at that place, General Wheeler finally desisting and withdrawing a short distance on account of the strong position occupied by the enemy, and the superior numbers which he reports him to have had. Colonel Hart, who was left at Kingston with a brigade of cavalry, reported that the enemy's force in front of General Wheeler there consisted of but three regiments of cavalry and a battery of artillery.