3. That the only possible place to enter the work was at and about the northwest angle, where the assault was made, and that if I had assaulted the fort on the west side from shoulder to shoulder of that front, which I am charged with "not informing my officers offered but a slight obstacle to infantry in entering the work," I would have ordered them to a place where the ditch was from 12 to 13 feet deep, which, with a corresponding parapet, would have required ladders 30 feet long to surmount.

4. That the assault failed because of the state of the weather the night previous to the assault and on the night of the assault; it having rained on the night of the 27th and then turning very cold, the parapet was hard frozen and a heavy ice crop was formed by the moisture from the bank, which prevented the men from obtaining a foothold, and the absence of a berme upon which the men could mount and start from. The main cause of failure was, however, the slipperiness of the parapet, upon which it was impossible for any large body of men to gain a foothold, and the severe fire from the north side of the fort, which drove the men from the most accessible point of ascent. And I may add that it is the opinion of distinguished officers who were engaged in the assault that if the skirmishers on the railroad side of the work had silenced the enemy's fire coming from that side, as it was silenced by my line of sharpshooters, the work would have been carried in spite of all the other obstacles. I do not think that ladders would have been of material assistance, unless they had been furnished in great numbers and had been 20 feet long. The reconnaissances were also defective, giving false notions of the character of the work and of the ditch.

Surgeon Cullen, of General Longstreet's staff, who was in the ditch (sent there under a flag of truce to attend the wounded), testified before the court that the ditch on the west side of the work from shoulder to shoulder was from 12 to 13 feet deep and on the north front it was on an average of 10 feet deep,and that it was about 10 feet wide all around the work; but from shoulder to shoulder of the northwest bastion it was but from 4 to 4 1/2 deep, and here it was the assault was made. From the bottom of the ditch along the west front from shoulder to the top of the parapet must have been over 20 feet perpendicular, and the same in the north front from the shoulder of the northwest bastion.

The evening of November 28, hearing from various sources, which I believed were entitled to consideration, that a serious engagement had occurred between General Bragg and General Grant at Chattanooga, I addressed a communication to General Longstreet, of which the following is a copy, as furnished from the adjutant-general's office of General Longstreet:

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, November 28, 1863.

GENERAL: It seems to be a conceded fact that there has been a serious engagement between General Bragg's forces and those of the enemy; with what result is not known so far as I have heard. General Bragg may have maintained his position, may have repulsed the enemy, or may have been driven back. If the enemy had been beaten at Chattanooga, do we not gain by delay at this point? If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, do we not risk our entire force by an assault here? If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, our communications must be made with Virginia. We cannot combine again with General Bragg, even if we should be successful in our assault on Knoxville. If we should be defeated or unsuccessful here, and at the same time General Bragg should have been forced to retire, would we be in condition to force our way to the army in Virginia? I present these considerations,