and with the force they have on my mind I beg leave to say that I think we had better delay the assault until we hear the result of the battle of Chattanooga. The enemy may have cut our communication to prevent this army re-enforcing General Bragg, as well as for the opposite reason, viz, to prevent General Bragg from re-enforcing us, and the attack at Chattanooga favors the first proposition.

Very respectfully,

L. McLAWS,

Major-General.

The letter of which the foregoing is a copy, with no address beyond that on the envelope, was received by Lieutenant-General Longstreet on the night of November 28, 1863.

G. MOXLEY SORREL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

The fortifications of the city of Knoxville are upon a series of heights circling the town, comprising Mabry's Hill, Temperance Hill, Loudon Fort Hill, and College Hill. These heights were connected by rifle-pits and defended by redoubts and rifle-pits, and besides these there were intermediate redoubts, loop-holed houses, and other kinds of defenses, abatis, &c.; also a series of heights on the opposite or south side of the river, which are superior in elevation to those on the north side, and which were fortified and commanded the town completely. A pontoon bridge across the river at the southeast corner of the town connected the two sets of defenses. A creek called Second Creek, which flowed between Fort Loudon and Summit Fort, on Summit Hill, had been dammed up, so as to make a pond between the two heights (so I am informed), thus disconnecting Fort Loudon form the line of defenses to the east, viz: Summit Fort, Temperance Hill Fort, Mabry's Hill, &c.

The accompanying sketch, * with a profile of heights along the dotted lines A B,will give an idea of the heights and the relative position of the enemy's works. The forts are merely indicated; it is not attempted to give their character or shape, nor the line of rifle-pits, or other than the main fortifications.

If an assault was made upon Knoxville which did not contemplate the immediate occupation or destruction of the bridge across the Holston connecting the town with the south side of the river, the enemy would undoubtedly cross to that side if the town should be seriously threatened, and occupying the heights there prevent our occupation of the town, and bidding us defiance remain there until their re-enforcements arriving (should Grant have forced General Bragg to retire), they would then have assumed the offensive, and by crossing the French Broad and moving on our rear toward Virginia force us to a precipitate retreat in that direction; for we would have no other way to go, leaving our sick and wounded-and the number of the latter must have been very large to have forced the enemy from Knoxville-and we would have retired with but a very limited amount of ammunition, and with no chances of a resupply within the borders of Tennessee.

On the other hand, if General Bragg, had defeated General Grant Knoxville was ours without the necessity of an assault. I was not informed of any plan of assault beyond what was communicated to me in General Longstreet's letter to me of November 28, herein recorder, wherein he directed me to prepare for the assault, and informed me that General Jenkins would advance to the assault, "following my movement," and General Johnson would support General Jenkins and myself; but I supposed his intentions, after taking Fort