with this army. In reply, I am directed to say that throughout the campaign on which we are engaged you have exhibited a want of confidence in the efforts and plans which the commanding general has thought proper to adopt, and he is apprehensive that this feeling will extend more or less to the troops under you command.

Under these circumstances the commanding general has felt that the interest of the public service would be advanced by your separation from him, and as he could not himself leave he decided upon the issue of the order which you have received.

I have the honor to be, general, with great respect, your obedient servant,

G. MOXLEY SORREL,

Lieutenant-Colonel, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

As I was not informed of any instance wherein I had exhibited any want of confidence in the plans and efforts of the commanding general, and am still ignorant that I have ever done so, I can but close with the regret that my conduct has been misunderstood or misrepresented. If I have failed ever in any duty it was because I was ignorant of the plans or efforts which the commanding general wished me to carry out or to make.

As I left my division on the next day after receiving the orders above quoted and went across the country to Augusta, Ga., I am not informed personally of its movements thereafter.

On reviewing the campaign I cannot but remark-with no spirit of fault-finding, however, as I was totally unacquainted with General Longstreet's plans and therefore not informed whether or not he desired to bring the enemy to an engagement or to force them to retire only toward Knoxville-that if the leading division (Hood's), commanded by Brigadier-General Jenkins, had marched on instead of turning to the right and forming line of battle toward Lenoir's Station on November 15 the enemy could have been intercepted in his retreat either at Campbell's Station or at a point 7 miles from the forks of the road, where my division was halted and brought to a decisive engagement, which, in the existing demoralized state of the enemy, as shown by his hasty retreat from Lenoir's Station, would have rendered the siege of Knoxville unnecessary and its fall a sequence of the battle. Our army could then have either returned to Chattanooga or have threatened the enemy's rear in the direction of Kingston, and the battle of Missionary Ridge would never have occurred, or the final result would have been more favorable to our cause.

I was informed on the evening of the 15th, after dark, by one of my couriers, who was acquainted with the country, and by citizens of standing who lived in the vicinity, that there was a road which, turning off from the Campbell's Station road 4 miles from the forks where I was, led into the road upon which the enemy were 6 or 7 miles from my position, and that if we could gain the junction a small force could hold the place against great odds, as the position was a very strong one. I wrote to General Longstreet informing him of this road after dark on the 15th, but whether or not he received my note I am not aware, as no answer was returned. The leading division could, however, have easily marched to Campbell's Station the evening previous, and a demonstration of my division upon Lenoir's Station would have covered the movement until after dark, when I could have joined the leading division, or have remained in position to act as the movements of the enemy demanded.

Again, I believe that if Knoxville had been assaulted on the evening of our arrival there, or the evening after (the 18th), when Kershaw's brigade assaulted and carried the outworks of the enemy,