that we could have either forced an evacuation on the night of the 17th or have gained a position which would have rendered the town untenable; but our troops were never assembled for an assault until the 29th, but, on the contrary, they were deployed in enveloping the town.

When the assault was made on the 29th,if Hood's division, on my left, had assaulted the enemy's works to the left (my left) of Fort Loudon, and at the same time my assault was made, both points would probably have been carried, and without the loss of as many men as I suffered in attempting the fort alone, as my loss was inflicted chiefly by a deliberate fire from the left of the fort, which was not kept down by the sharpshooters there, but which would have been diverted and rendered less accurate if the point had been assaulted. But if the assault had not been made at all we could have changed our base upon the receipt of the news of General Bragg having been compelled to fall back from Missionary Ridge, selected a position in the rear of Knoxville toward Virginia, and retired at our leisure, for I do not believe that the enemy would have ventured to have followed us to an engagement, even if he had been re-enforced, for the country, by reason of its narrow valleys between inaccessible mountains, offered strong defensible positions to enable a small force to successfully resist one much superior, and we thus could have made use of a vast amount of grain and hay and subsistence which was afterward wasted by the enemy. As it was, the enemy made no pursuit of us, but following at a distance retreated as we turned on them.

On the night of the 8th, after my arrival at Mooresburg, I sent for my chief quartermaster and commissary, who had been there in advance of the command, and they informed me that in the section of country which could be foraged from that place subsistence stores and forage were more abundant than in any section north of it, and the commissary (Major Edwards) gave me a list of mills around the country which could be used in making flour and corn-meal for the troops. I informed General Longstreet by letter to his adjutant-general (Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel) of these facts, but no reply was given. The troops were marched on, however, and the enemy came up in the rear, destroying and wasting everything not absolutely needed for themselves, and then our army returned on the 14th and had to fight to get back the country which they could have had unmolested by remaining there.

After the assault (the day after, I believe, or it may have been two or three days after), at a council of war called by General Longstreet, consisting of Lieutenant-General Longstreet, Maj. General L. McLaws, Brig. General B. R. Johnson, Brigadier-General Jenkins, Brigadier-General Kershaw, and Colonel E. P. Alexander, the question was submitted as to the best course to be pursued-whether to join General Bragg or to change our base looking toward Virginia. The council was informed by General Longstreet that he had received a telegram from President Davis directing him to join General Bragg, if possible, with his forces. Several telegrams, or one at least, from General B., was shown, wherein it stated that General Bragg's army had retired toward Dalton, Ga., the exact point I do not recollect, and intimating that if he (General L.) could join him in would be desirable, but the could not except any assistance from General B. in making the effort. Such is my recollection. Telegrams from