the officers in command at Loudon and below, showing that the enemy were advancing toward Loudon, were also submitted.

To the question, then, whether we should attempt to join General Bragg, or change our base toward Virginia, I was called on for my opinion, being next in rank to General L. I submitted that our first duty was to endeavor to join General Bragg, as the President directed, and General Bragg intimated as being his desire, and in discussing that question I argued against making the attempt, for the reason that we could not go by the route we came, but would have to choose one farther to the east, and there was none in that direction that did not lead through a rough, mountainous, and desolate country, where neither forage nor subsistence could be obtained for the men and animals. That snow, as we could perceive, had fallen over that country, which would add to the difficulties of the march, as many of our men were without shoes, and our sick would be unable to be divided in order to obtain subsistence, in which event it would be a long time before we could be united again, so as to be of efficient service, and that the mere fact of retiring in that direction would thus abandon East Tennessee to the enemy, and the fainthearted would despond and perhaps leave us, especially those of that class in the regiments from Tennessee, and at the same time the enemy, having nothing to oppose them in East Tennessee, could re-enforce General Grant at Chattanooga with nearly their entire force from Knoxville, and thus enable him to push on before our forces could possibly join General Bragg, even in the unserviceable condition they would be in after the long and tedious march over the desolate country we would be compelled to travel.

On the other hand, if we remained in East Tennessee, with our base changed toward Virginia, our force would act as a constant menace upon General Grant's flank and rear,and compel him to keep one equally as large in and about Knoxville to watch our movements. That we owed it to the people of East Tennessee, who had been loyal to us, to afford them some protection and not abandon them suddenly to the enemy. That the effect upon our troops would be beneficial, and that we would by remaining relieve Georgia and the whole South, excepting East Tennessee, from the burden of subsisting our forces, at a time, too, when the relief would be very sensibly felt; and that if we did have to draw heavily upon the resources of East Tennessee we would be drawing from a population the large majority of which we inimical to our cause, and which would be much better than necessitating us to oppress those farther south who were entirely loyal.

There was no dissent from these views and the army was withdrawn toward Virginia. I do not claim that my views were the cause of that course being adopted, but I merely place my opinion upon record. I have no doubt but any other member of the council would have given the same opinion and have more forcibly expressed it.*

L. McLAWS,

Major-General.

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*Casualties in McLaws' division at Bean's Station: Kershaw's brigade-killed, 5; wounded, 52; missing, 5; total, 62. Bryan's brigade-killed, 1; wounded, 1; total, 2.

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