barren, producing no more than is necessary for the support of a poor and sparse population. East of Stevenson, as far as Chattanooga, it may be said to de destitute both of population and supplies. Beyond Chattanooga the productive region of East Tennessee commences; but during last summer it was exhausted of supplies, and the people themselves were, as they are now, notwithstanding the new crop they have since gathered, suffering for food. These facts go to the extent of resources of the country. The alternative of drawing its supplies from its principal base, the Ohio River, was imperative, was imperative, and my wagon transportation was not sufficient to cover barks in the railroads north of huntsville and to advance beyond Bridgeport at the same time.

The first essential, therefore, was the opening of the railroads form Nashville; and to that end the force which General Mitchel had been ordered to put at that works was increased by engineer and other troops to the whole force that could be employed. Hired mechanics, under the military superintendent of railroads, an able and efficient man at such work, were also employed, and orders were given to push forward the repairs with all possible dispatch. But the work was much more formidable than been supposed, and the work which i had expected to see completed in ten or fifteen days was not finished until the s of July on the Nashville and Decatur road. The Nashville and Chattanooga road was completed on the 12th of July; the trains started through on the 13th, and were stopped by the attack and surrender at Murfreesborough, by which and by subsequent successful attacks the completion of that road was delayed until the 28th of July.

In order to conceal the object, or at least the progress, of my campaign as much as possible it was desirable not to concentrate my force at a point which immediately threatened the enemy's position until I was prepared to move against him. This was also expedient from the necessity of placing the troops in positions where they could be most conveniently subsisted, and where they could give the necessary assistance in repairing the roads and in guarding them until they should be securely established, and protected at the more vulnerable points by stockades or other defenses which would enable a small force to maintain itself against a larger one. Prior to my arrival in North Alabama, however, General Mitchel had entertained serious apprehensions of an attack on the positions which he occupied in that region, particularly at Battle Creek and along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and repeated dispatches from him urged the pressing importance of reenforcements to guard against the supposed danger. These reports of a probable attack at Battle Creek were repeated just after my arrival, and rendered it proper to increase the force at that point. McCook's and Crittenden's division were accordingly ordered there. They marched from Athens about the 4th and arrived at Battle Creek about the 14th of July. One brigade from the former was put at work on the road from Stevenson to Decherd. Nelson's division still remained at Athens, furnishing a strong working party on that road. Wood's division was stopped near Decatur, where it protected the ferry and the small garrison on the opposite side of the river the idea not having been yet abandoned of making the Memphis and Chattanooga road west that point available for supplying my troops and communicating with the forces about Corinth. With these dispositions, orders were given for establishing the regular road guards and for getting to

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