gether again the fragments of brigades and regiments previously there, which were found scattered in very great confusion; a brigade was organized to move from Murfreesborough and Tullahoma and occupy McMinnville; intelligent and energetic officers were put in charge of the road guards and road repairs; mills were set to work to get out lumber for a pontoon bridge; horses were ordered for the cavalry, which had been left in Middle Tennessee, and was in bad condition; and various other preparations ordered to enable the troops to move promptly and effectively as soon as the roads were completed so that supplies could be provided.

The first raid of Morgan into Kentucky took place early in July. He threatened Bowling Green and Munfordville about the 8th of July, defeated three companies of cavalry at Burkesville abbot the same time, and then went to Lebanon, where he destroyed the depot and hospital buildings. Thence he proceeded north through Lexington as far as Paris. He was engaged at Paris and other points during his expedition, but with no important result. he finally recrossed the Cumberland River at or near Mill Springs about the 23rd of July and made his way to Knoxville.

The force which made this incursion has been has been said not to have exceeded 1,000 men, though at the time it was estimated as high as 2,500 or 3,000. It procured a good deal of alarm in State, and many apprehended that the force would receive large accessions to its ranks and that the sympathizing part of the population would become troublesome, but those apprehensions were not realized. The injury was confined mainly to the inconvenience and suffering inflicted on individuals, and I have no doubt that the effect on the population was to strengthen its adhesion to the Union.

A good deal of censure was cast on the troops and the military officers in the State that Morgan should have escaped without capture or greater loss, but not with much justice, when the circumstances are considered. The objects to be aimed at by my army, after the occupation of Nashville in February, made it necessary to carry forward, for further operations, nearly the whole of the force at my disposal; and, indeed, the high stage of water in the Cumberland River afforded security at that time against such invasions, even if the rebel force had not left that region of country to concentrate for the struggle on the south side of the Tennessee. For these reasons, except the column which was operating against Cumberland Gap, not more than about 4,000 troops, mostly infantry, were left behind, and these were scattered over the principal part of the State, more as a police force and to guard railroads than to prevent invasion.

The probable result of our operations against Corinth developed to my mind the advantage the enemy could derive from the employment of a large cavalry force in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, and on the 12th of May I advised the Secretary of War of the necessity of having at least five more cavalry regiments in those two States. I was an swerved that there was not at the time any cavalry to spare for that service, but that an additional force was to be raised, and that a part of it would be sent to me. None came,though authority was given to the officer commanding in Kentucky to raise some cavalry regiments. These, however, were in no condition to render much service at the time of Morgan's first raid. Subsequent events have shown, what might have been evident enough without the experiment, that to prevent such incursions and carry on the operations in front which the progress of our arms had rendered necessary was physically impossi-