ble with the force that was available. I had a front extending from Corinth to Cumberland Gap, through a hostile population, a distance of 300 miles; in fact it extended to Piketon, in the northeast corner of Kentucky, 100 miles farther, with lines of communication varying from 200 to 300 miles in depth. To press successfully against the rebel armies along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad it had been necessary to denude the lines and the whole country in my rear almost entirely of troops. The front from Battle Creek to Cumberland Gap it was not possible to occupy at all. Is it astonishing that 1,000 cavalry, familiar with every path, should be able to penetrate this vast extent of country and escape of country and escape without capture?

Morgan had not yet disappeared from Kentucky, after his first inroad, when Forrest, with a large force, suddenly appeared at Murfreesborough on the 13th of July, surprised and captured the garrison, costing of some 1,400 men-cavalry, artillery, and infantry-forming part of the force which was about to march from that place and Tullahoma to occupy McMinnvile, and did serious damage to the railroad. Two other regiments which had been designed as a permanent garrison for Murfreesborough had been detached and sent into Kentucky on the occasion of Morgan's incursion. The consequence of this disaster was serious. The use of the railroad from Nashville, which had been completed the very day before and which I was depending on to throw supplies into Stevenson for a forward movement, was set back two weeks; the force of Forrest threatened Nashville itself and the whole line of railroad through Tennessee, and the occupation of McMinnville was delayed two weeks. It became necessary to move northward some of the troops in North Alabama to drive out the rebel force and guard against further embarrassment. Nelson's division was ordered by rapid marches to Murfreesborough, one brigade going by railroad through Nashville; two brigades of Wood's division were ordered from Decatur to Shelbyville by forced marches and subsequently to Decherd, to give greater security to Elk River Bridge and guard the important route form the mountains into North Alabama through Winchester. A little later the remaining brigade of Wood's division was ordered to Stevenson to erect defensive works for the depot which was to be established at that point for the movement against Chattanooga. The excitement caused by Morgan's raid into Kentucky had been so great and the call for troops so urgent that I apprehended I should be compelled to send a division there; but to do that was to put and advance into East Tennessee out of the question, and I determined to trust Kentucky the few troops already there rather than abandon the object for which I had started.

The movement of General Nelson toward Nashville was delayed somewhat by injury to the Duck River Bridge by high water. He arrived at Murfreesborough on the 18th. The enemy left as he advanced, threw himself on the road between that place and nashville, and captured a guard of about 80 men and destroyed two more bridges. The efforts of General Nelson to intercept him were unsuccessful. After throwing up some field works for a small force at Murfreesborough to protect the depot which it was necessary to establish there, General Nelson started on the 2nd of August with two brigades and arrived at McMinnville on the 3rd of August. One brigade remained at Murfreesborough, but on the arrival of the force which had been designated to occupy the place that brigade joined him at McMinnville.

The railroad from Nashville to Stevenson was completed on the 28th of July, that from Nashville to Decatur on the 31st, and preparations