to strengthen the force in that quarter; but the difficulty of crossing the mountain weakened the probability of an advance in that direction, while an advance into North Alabama was not only spoken of in connection with the enemy's plans, but offered many advantages. By crossing Walden's Ridge into the Sequatchie Valley he had a good level road down that valley to Battle Creek, which was an indefensible position for us while he occupied the opposite side of the Tennessee River with his artillery. This would keep him in constant communication with his supplies at Chattanooga by men as of the railroad on the opposite bank and the steamers which he had; his large cavalry force operating against Nashville and on my lines of communication would compel me to employ at least 20,000 men to protect them even that far, leaving about 25,000 men to oppose his advance in front. If the column from Kingston should advance on Nashville I should be compelled to fall back in the face of even an inferior force for the protection of that place; and thus both Alabama and the principal part of Middle Tennessee could be reclaimed by the enemy without necessarily risking a battle. Its is not too much to say that 50,000 men thus employed on this theater of operations, with the superior cavalry forces which the enemy had, would be an overmatch for 60,000 operating upon lines of such depth in the midst of an unfriendly population.

Such were the inducements which an advance upon Battle Creek offered to the enemy, even supposing that I was entirely on the north side of the Cumberland ridge, say at Decherd; but in fact he was well aware that I still occupied North Alabama, with some 12,000 men at Battle Creek, while the rest of my force extended as far north and east as McMinnville. If he could reach Battle Creek before the force at that place should extricate itself by moving to the east it would have to go around by the away of Huntsville, and this make a march of 120 miles to reach Decherd, the nearest point at which it could possibly form a junction with the forces north of the mountain, while he, by a march of 25 miles from Jasper, could reach the same point, and thus throw his whole force between my scattered troops. The position at Battle Creek is, for a force whose communications are on the north side of the mountain, one of the worst that can be imagined against an enemy coming from the Sequatchie Valley and holding the opposite bank of the Tennessee River. A spur of the Cumberland ridge comes to within 200 yards of the river; Battle Creek runs at the foot of this spur on the east side, emptying into the river near the point; the only position for troops is west of the spur; the road to Decherd, a distance of 25 miles, passes around the point of this spur and along its side up Battle Creek in full view from the opposite side of the river and the creek; and there is no other road to the north side of the mountain practicable for loaded wagons short of Huntsville, distant 75 miles.

For the double purpose of guarding against an attack in this faulty position and of observing the movements and checking the advance of the enemy in the Sequatchie Valley I issued the instructions of the 19th of August to Major-General McCook, my purpose then being to attack the enemy in the Sequatchie Valley if possible or to give him battle at the first point on his route where I could concentrate my troops. Those orders required General McCook, upon the first intelligence of an advance of the enemy toward the Sequatchie Valley, to move promptly up the valley to the Anderson and Therman road with the two brigades of his division which were with him, to check the progress of the enemy and observe his movements. If pressed, he was to fall back on the Therman road deliberately until he should form a junction with