the main force coming from the side of McMinnville. The other division which was with him at Battle Creek, General Crittenden's, was also to move up the valley to the Tracy City and Altamount road, which enters the valley 10 miles below the Therman road. He was to support General McCook in the valley, watching the old Nashville and Chattanooga stage road, which enters if from the Tennessee River at the point designated, and under like circumstances he was to fall back for a similar purpose on the Higginbottom road toward Tracy City and Altamont, where the junction would be formed.

On the 20th I learned that the enemy was certainly crossing at Chattanooga and other points, and I immediately directed General McCook to execute the orders already described. On the same day I left Huntsville, visited the posts at Stevenson and Battle Creek, and the following day went to Decherd to direct the movements for the proposed junction. I deemed it of the highest importance, for political as well as military reasons, to maintain my position in North Alabama, if possible, in connection with those movements, for which the instructions of the 19th of August, given to General Rousseau, the officer in command in North Alabama, in anticipation of my advance upon Chattanooga, were equally applicable; but I reduced the forced the force in that quarter somewhat, leaving a regiment in fortifications at Battle Creek, one at Stevenson, and two at Hunstville, besides the road guards and the force on the Nashville and Decatur line. The orders for the concentration at Altamont (see the instructions of the 23rd of August to General Thomas) had reference to the plan of operations above referred to for opposing the movements of the enemy, except that the information rendered it apparently certain that the enemy would advance on the Therman road, and that Altamont was the point farthest to the front at which he could be met. On the first supposition I had expected to intercept him in the Sequatchie Valley.

In moving up the valley on the 20th General McCook received information from his spies and scouts which made him believe that the enemy would be in the Sequatchie Valley, and therefore in a position to intercept him before he could march to the Therman road, and he therefore returned down the valley to the Higginbottom road. That road was found to be impracticable for his artillery, and he moved still nearer to Battle Creek, and put himself on the road which follows up Battle Creek and then crosses the mountain. I there sent him orders on the concentration at Altamount. The difficulties of the route prevented the concentration at the time appointed,and in the mean time information in regard to the movements of the enemy made it a matter of very great doubt whether it could be effected at that point at all before the enemy would anticipate it. The only alternative seemed to be to concentrate there or at Murfreesborough. I determined to attempt the former, and gave the orders accordingly. Those orders anticipated that, from the greater difficulties General McCook had to overcome, the troops moving from McMinnville under Major-General Thomas would reach Altamont first. The latter was instructed to attack the enemy's advance if it should have reached there, and hold his position, if possible, until the other troops came up; and in the event of being unable to do that the various columns were instructed as to the roads by which they should fall back to form a junction in rear. General Thomas marched to Altamont with a portion of his force at the time appointed. He found no enemy, and believing that he could not remain there for want of water, returned immediately to McMinnville. On his report and in conse-