quence of his action I stopped the movement of all except General McCook's division, which remained at Altamont in observation until the final concentration at Murfreesborough.

The information which I received still pointed clearly to the Therman road as the one by which the enemy would advance, if at all. It is the best road across the mountain, and has the advantage of branching at Altamont into no less than four roads, which descend the mountain to an arc 40 miles long, from McMinnville on one flank to Decherd on the other. Still the movements of the enemy were less rapid than was expected, and placed him in a position to use that road or those farther east. May officers doubted that he meant to cross out of the Sequatchie Valley at all, but supposed that his movements were only intended as demonstrations to cover the advance of his columns into Kentucky from Knoxville.

I the mean time our supplies were diminishing rapidly, with no prospect of renewal until a sufficient force was detached to restore our broken communications. These pressing necessity left no time either to advance or to await the arrival of an enemy who could choose his time and route, with the certainty that the necessity of subsistence would very soon compel me to fall back, in whole or in part, whether there was an enemy in front or not, as long his cavalry continued its operations in rear. The new from Kentucky was unsatisfactory. The rebel under Kirby Smith was coming into the State, there was nothing but new levies to oppose him, and it was not known what number of them had been collected. So far from being able to open the communication between Nashville and Louisville and from Cumberland Gap to Lexington, it was not improbable that those places themselves might soon be seized be the rebel forces. Under these circumstances I determined to concentrate my army at Murfreesborough and set to work to open the railroad north of Nashville. That object had already been delayed too long the hope of having it done by a force from Louisville. Orders were accordingly given on the 30th of August to the various commands and guards, distributed over an area of about 150 by 100 miles of territory and some 300 miles of railroad, so as to concentrate on the 5th of September. The routes and marches were prescribed, and the movement was executed simultaneously and with perfect precision. Which the exception of the force on the Decatur road, which was ordered to nashville, the whole army, coming from various quarters and different distances on four roads, concentrated at Murfreesborough on the 5th of September, bringing with it whatever suplies could be collected from the country. A small remnant of provision for which there was insufficient transportation, was destroyed at Huntsville, and with that exception not a pound of supplies was lost by the movement. After it was ordered I learned that a considerable quantity of cotton, belonging to persons who had purchase it in the country, was at Athens, awaiting transportation. In order to give them an opportunity to remove it I delayed the evacuation of that place perhaps a day or so.

On the 1st of September I learned that a large rebel force, under General Kirby Smith, had actually appeared in Central Kentucky, having defeated and routed the force under General Nelson at Richmond. This effectually cut off the divisions at Cumberland Gap from its base. I was anxious to rescue that force, and the shortest route by which it could be done was to direct a column from McMinnville, by the way of Somerset, upon the rear of Kirby Smith's army. I supposed that that might be done and still keep a front about McMinnville to