some of the supplies were brought up the Cumberland by boats. Where these supplies came from, whether from Louisville or other points, I do not know, nor can I say what time the Cumberland River ceased to be navigable for us. But during the latter period of our occupation of Tennessee we were wholly dependent on the line of Louisville and Nashville Railroad for our supplies. Occasionally some small supplies were found, as I mentioned, in the country.

Question. Do you know anything of the interruption of the railroad between Nashville and Louisville, by which the army was cut off from its source of supplies?

It was a matter of notoriety to everybody in the Army of the Ohio that the line of communication between Louisville and Nashville, as well as between Nashville and points farther south occupied by the army, was interrupted, by which the army was cut off from its supplies. We were frequently for a number of days, but I cannot state how many, without mail communication, and the reason always assigned, and which I believe was true, was the interruption of communication. At one period while I was at Decherd I found it necessary, on account of the interruption of communication and the importance arising therefrom of getting supplies, to take possession of all the mills in the neighborhood to obtain breadstuff for the men by grinding corn; but this was a difficult operation, and could not have been depended upon for a long period, nor could a large body of men have been subsisted by such means.

Question. What was the extreme length of the line of communication of the army from Louisville to points which it occupied in Alabama?

I should say that the average extended over 300 miles.

Question. Considering the scarcity of supplies in the country and the numbers and efficiency of the rebel cavalry, regular and irregular, what do you think of the practicability of depending upon the country for supplies for the army and carrying on at the same time active operations in a mountainous region, beyond the sphere in which these supplies were to be obtained, if at all?

I do not think it would be practicable, sir.

Question. Is it an axiom in military science that the army on the defensive in mountain warfare has the advantage?

Yes, sir. I should regard it as a military axiom that the party holding the mountain and living upon it can with a much smaller force maintain their position than the attacking party. I thing the history of all mountain wars will bear out the statement.

Question. Was it at the option of General Bragg in invading Middle Tennessee to assume the offensive or defensive?

Yes, sir. I have already described a number of routes by which General Bragg could have crossed the mountains and descended into the plains of Middle Tennessee. By these routes offensive operations were of course open to him. On the other hand, he could have occupied a position in the mountains from which he might have threatened different points in Middle Tennessee. At the same time he could with his cavalry have carried on active operations, as was done, without occupying these positions in the mountains in our rear. Had General Bragg occupied such a position in the mountains his general war, in reference to any operations against him by the Army of the Ohio, would necessarily have been a defensive war.

Question. Supposing it had been certainly known that General Bragg designed to pass through Pikeville for the purpose of taking either the road to Sparta or McMinnville at his option, would it have been possible for my army to occupy a position in the mountains which would have had more than the effect to delay his movements, considering the condition of supplies, considering also the circumstances we had in view, and would it or would it not have been necessary at length to fall back?

From my knowledge of the position in the mountains, I do not think there is any point the occupation of which would have prevented General Bragg from moving by the route passing through Pikeville, considering, of course, the state of our supplies