and the facilities which would then have existed for occupying such a position for obtaining supplies for the army. It is furthermore my opinion that had such a position been occupied on the hypothesis that General Bragg would not attempt to cross the mountains or pass up the Sequatchie Valley around the spur of mountains by Sparta, it would have been necessary to fall back and concentrate at some point in the plains of Middle Tennessee. This opinion os based upon my knowledge of the difficulty of getting supplies through the mountain, the badness of the roads, and also my judgment that the occupation of a point in the mountains merely should not have so seriously threatened the enemy's movements up the Sequatchie Valley, and would have rendered it necessary he should have cleared the position in the mountains.

Question. Was it generally understood, about the time of the enemy's advance from Chattanooga, that Nashville was the enemy's objective point?

My recollection of the weight of opinion of officer with whom I conversed about the time of the advance of General Bragg from Chattanooga is that Nashville was the objective point. Up to that time no demonstrations had been made which could lead to entertaining any other opinion.

Question. If it was improper under the circumstances to oppose the advance of Bragg's army into Middle Tennessee in or near the mountains, what, considering the character of the country and the position of the roads, was the natural and necessary point for concentrating the army to oppose his advance upon Nashville?

I think Murfreesborough was the most eligible point in the case stated, considering also the position and disposition at the time of our own troops.

Question. At what point in the line of march from Sparta on toward Kentucky could it first be certainly assumed that Kentucky was his destination?

After the enemy had passed above the spur of the mountains north of Sparta, and the information of his movements not indicating that he had turned westward with the bulk of his forces, but was perhaps continuing his movements northward, it would leave ground for conjecture that he had another object than Nashville. My information would go to show that parties were detached from about Sparta in the direction of Smithfield and Lebanon about the time the enemy was in that region of country. What was the extent of these parties I do not know. This occurred about the 5th or 6th of September. I tried myself to gain all the information I could of the movements of the enemy, and I confess I was not satisfied fully in my own mind up to that time whether his object was Nashville or Kentucky. I arrived in this city with my division on the 6th of September. Upon thinking over all the information I had been able to gain up to that time I began seriously to believe, from the movements of the enemy, that he had another object than Nashville, and of course that was Kentucky. I do not wish it understood that it was a positively entertained conviction. In consequence of beginning to entertain this conviction seriously and to be prepared for either alternative, according to my judgment and the exigencies of the case, I suggested, in an interview which General Buell did me the honor to have with me that day, that it would be proper to pass his army or a portion of it to the north side of the cumberland river. This arrangement was proposed for a double purpose, both in reference to the invasion of Kentucky or an advance upon Nashville from the northern side of the river.

Question. When was it certainly ascertained that Bragg's army was advancing into Kentucky? And state how it was ascertained.

In a previous answer I have already stated that I crossed the Cumberland River at Nashville with my division early in the day of the 7th of September. I also gave in that answer the instructions I had from General Buell directing me to halt within two or three miles of Gallatin, on the Nashville side, and to remain there until I received further orders from him. He furthermore directed me to send out the cavalry attached to my division, and to try by all means to get information of the position, designs, and movements of the enemy. I conformed with these instructions. I sent out the cavalry during the day and kept them out till a considerable time after night-fall on Monday, September 8. On the return or the cavalry of was reported to me that they had met at various points directions a hostile cavalry force, but