country that in all probability the enemy would never attempt to lead a strong force through the mountains into the plains of Middle Tennessee, I should have made my arrangements for concentrating the troops at an early day at the most eligible point in Middle Tennessee. I should of course have had the mountain passes well watched and observed by means of cavalry through the agency of spies. I think it important to remark in this discussion on the utter improbability of the enemy's leading a strong force through the mountains. This is simply my opinion, but I was well satisfied the first time I never made an examination of that country that it would never be done and so stated it to General Thomas, and it was in consequence of this opinion, which he entertained as well as myself, that the two divisions I have spoken of as starting from McMinnville to go to Altamont were withdrawn, that is, ;by direction of General Thomas. By concentrating the troops in Middle Tennessee, ever if the opinion that the enemy would not invade the country through the mountains was not correct, we should still have been in position to fall upon him as soon as he came out of the mountains, and at the same time be prepared to meet any movement up the Sequatchie Valley around the spur of the mountains into Kentucky. The fact that the enemy would have got possession of the country between the foot of the mountains and Murfreesborough which might have been selected as the point of concentration I do not consider a matter of material importance. Had we beaten his army, of course the country would soon again have fallen into our possession.

On the other hand, he could not have dared to pass us with a view of attacking Nashville, and would have been compelled, of course supposing Nashville to have been his chief object, to have beaten the concentrated Army of the Ohio in position first. By concentration at Murfreesborough or some such point we should more effectually have protected our communications to the rear than was possible by concentrating in the mountains. We should have greatly lessened the difficulties of obtaining the supplies that were drawn outside the limits of Tennessee, as well as increased our facilities for obtaining those which we did get in Tennessee. By this arrangement the commander would better have had his forces in hand and been prepared to meet any exigency that the events of the campaign might develop. As I have already described in various answers the number of roads by which it was absolutely practicable, though highly improbable, that the enemy could move across the mountains, consequently the simple occupation of any single position by our troops would not have effectually prevented such a passage; hence the necessity of early concentration at Murfreesborough or some other point in Middle Tennessee.

Question. Continuing now the hypothesis in the preceding question, and supposing your forces concentrated, as you have stated, at or near Murfreesborough, and supposing that you have received reliable information that the enemy has passe to the north of Sparta, please to consider that you have the information which General Buell was probably possessed of from day to day. After that please continue your plan of campaign up as far as Munfordville, supposing the enemy to have pursued the line of march which he actually did pursue.

In the first place I will remark, in regard to the operations if the army after being concentrated at Murfreesborough, that by an early concentration of the army at Murfreesborough, with proper preparations, - it is problematical of course, - but I entertain the opinion that if this had been done early enough the rebel army under Bragg might have been prevented passing much farther north than Sparta. But under the supposition that he had evaded the army concentrated at Murfreesborough and got so far advance d that he could not be stopped before getting across the Cumberland River, which the question seems to indicate, I should have crossed my have tried, by a rapid movement of it along the line of turnpike form Nashville to Gallatin, Scottsville, Glasgow, and into Kentucky, to have brought the enemy to battle if he persisted in marching on that road or compelled him to abandon that line of march and conduct his operations farther to the east.

Supposing the enemy to have been brought to battle and a victory to have been attained, of course it would have protected Bowling Green, Nashville, Munfordville, Louisville, &c. But if he had avoided battle and had moved farther to the eastward, Bowling Green and Munfordville would both have been effectually protected.

Question. After it was known at Nashville that the enemy had crossed the Cumberland River was it possible to conduct the Army of the Ohio to Glasgow by the route you have stated in force be ford the arrival of the enemy there?