It is impossible for me to answer that question, because I do not know when it was known at Nashville that the enemy had crossed the river.

Question. Please answer the question under the supposition that it was known at Nashville the following day after the enemy crossed the river, supposing the Army of the Ohio to be concentrated at Nashville.

No, sir; under the supposition given I do not think the Army of the Ohio could have concentrated at Glasgow before the enemy concentrated his troops there. The supposition is, as I understand it, that the Army of the Ohio could have concentrated at Nashville. The other hypothesis is that the information of the crossing of the enemy is not received at Nashville till one day after the passage had been effected. According to my information the bulk of the enemy's forces crossed the Cumberland River at Gainesborough. The distance from Gainesborough to Glasgow is about 50 miles; the distance from Nashville to Glasgow is about 85 miles. Of course from this data every one can make up his own opinion.

Question. Suppose the rebel army to have crossed the Cumberland River in its march to the North and the commander of the Army of the Ohio not to have been able to learn the exact whereabouts of the main force of the enemy on any particular day prior to his arrival at Glasgow, would it have been prudent, taking into view the danger of a flank attack and the number of roads by which such an attack might be made, to have pursued his course from Gallatin to Glasgow?

Under the hypothesis of ignorance of the enemy's position and the order considerations suggested in to, the danger of a flank attack, &c., and the hypothesis of there being a number of roads favoring such an operation, it would not have been considered among military men, in my judgment, a prudent movement. I think it would have been a bold and audacious one. I think, however, that with proper observation in regard to the movements of the enemy the very audacity might have made it successful, of course supposing it to have been carried out very rapidly and vigorously. It would not, very clearly, been a prudent one.

By General TYLER:

Question. For what length of time was your division engaged in the repairing of railroads after you left Corinth?

For one month, namely, the month of june, 1862, repairing the Charleston and Memphis road from Corinth to Decatur. Subsequently, that is in the month of August, 1862, it was engaged for about a week in opening and repairing the railroad leading from Tullahoma to McMinnville.

Question. Were other divisions of the army engaged in repairing these roads and to what extent?

So far as I have any information only one other division of the Army of the Ohio did any work in repairing railroads. This division was commanded by the late General Nelson, whose division relieved mine in the vicinity of Iuka and finished the bridge over Bear Creek, in the same neighborhood. It was common notoriety, and I believe true, that other troop belonging to the Army of the Ohio were engaged during the summer in opening railroads in Middle Tennessee.

Question. To what extent and for what military purposes were there railroads use afterward?

I think the part of the Memphis and Charleston road I have described as being repaired by my division was used to a very small extent in transporting provisions and troops. I do not think it ever amounted to a great deal; very few troops and few provisions were ever carried over that part of it. The roads of Middle Tennessee were used during the summer and early part of autumn in transporting supplies of every kind for the use of the Army of the Ohio and for transporting troops. I mean the roads of Middle Tennessee; the road leading from Nashville by the way of Columbia, Pulanski, and Athens to Huntsville; also the road leading from Nashville by way of Murfreesborough and Decherd to Stevenson. There is a branch from this road commencing at Tullahoma and leading to McMinnville.

Question. Did the repairing of the Memphis and Charleston road