Question. You have stated the number of batteries that were at Louisville at this period; how many pieces would they embrace?

I think they were all six-gun batteries excepting one, which was a four rifled gun battery; that would make forty pieces.

Question. Do you know anything about the topography of the ground about Munfordville, whether as a military position it is very strong or otherwise?

I understand it to be a very strong position, particularly on this side of the stream.

Question. Do you recognize that in battles the strength of the position occupied by the army which acts on the defensive has a great deal to do with the result of the engagement?

Yes, sir; the army standing on the defensive and taking up its position of course must have many advantages over the one acting on the offensive, supposing their numbers anything like equal. The strength of the position may be such as to counterbalance the effect of the superior numbers making the attack.

Question. Is it recognized as a principle in military operations that, with equal prospects of success, circumstances may make it improper to risk a battle in one case when it would be advisable or even necessary to do so in another?

Yes, sir; I can suppose cases of that nature. In the first place it would be improper under those circumstances to risk a battle where you would jeopardize your communications, and again it would be wise to risk a battle where they were comparatively safe. It might also be wise to risk a battle if you had re-enforcements near at hand that could save you in case of a disaster,and very unwise and imprudent where there were no re-enforcements or assistance that could be brought to bear. A general might be forced to fight a battle under such circumstances perhaps to save his army from starving; it might be the last alternative. It might be imprudent against to fight a battle under those circumstances where in case of a defeat the whole country would be left upon to the invading army, whereas by falling back they might defend themselves point by point until such dispositions might be made as to cope successfully in a better and stronger position and force the enemy to fight to disadvantage.

Question. Do you know anything about the condition of the Army of the Ohio as to supplies when it was following the rebel army toward Louisville and about the time that the rebel army was at Munfordville, in September?

Only by hearsay. I heard several general officers of that command in Louisville, previous to the arrival of the army there, and some that were with it, say that they had been for a portion of the time on half rations; that a part of the way they had been compelled to make forced marches on that account. Generals Crittendens, Wood, McCook, and Nelson, I know, told me they were very short of rations. I know that a requisition came from General Buell, for I saw it, that he wished four millions of rations to be sent by steamer to Brandenburg. The dispatch came when he was somewhere above Bowling Green.

Question. Do you know of supplies having been ordered to the mouth of Salt River to meet the army on its arrival there;and was it understood that that was necessary for the subsistence of the army?

Yes,sir. It has slipped my memory for the moment.

Question. With the supplies exhausted and the rebel army between it and its base what must have been the probable consequence of a repulse, or even a very serious check, of the Army of the Ohio in an attack upon the rebel army at Munfordville?

It must have produced a dissolution, breaking up, and capture of the Army of the Ohio.

Question. Suppose the Army of the Ohio to have been destroyed or disabled in this way, what would have been the consequence to the cause of the Government in Kentucky?

It would have been the loss of the State for six or twelve months to come; in fact