it is hardly possible to foresee or foretell what would have been the real consequences. I do not see anything to have prevented the rebel army from crossing the Ohio River.

Question. With a small garrison at Munfordville, the Army of the Ohio at Bowling Green, and the rebel army equal, or nearly equal, between these two points, and within 10 miles of the only road between them, and supposing it possible to throw a portion of the Army of the Ohio into Munfordville for the purpose of strengthening the garrison there against an attack by the rebel army or any portion of it, would such a disposition have been judicious or injudicious?

Does it suppose that the rebel army is concentrated?

Question. Yes, sir; concentrated or with the means of concentrating within twenty-four hours.

I should have regarded the movement or attempt to have thrown a partial force there as extremely hazardous; it would be a violation of one of the great principles of war to separate one's forces, which I have always fought against sine this was commenced. I hardly see how it would be possible, supposing the two forces to occupy the position described, to have thrown a force into Munfordville, the rebel army occupying the road from Glasgow which runs nearly parallel with the pike. It would have been exposed in flank and liable to capture or to be cut to pieces at any so great that the rebel force would have reached there before it could.

Question. With the force that was being thrown into Kentucky by the Government about the time of Bragg's invasion, which would have been the most judicious and advantageous arrangement for the commander of the Army of the Ohio, coming from Tennessee - to have forced the rebel army still farther into Kentucky or to have passed it and left it in possession of Middle Tennessee and Southern Kentucky?

I do not understand whether you intend to hold Nashville, Bowling Green,&c., or to give them up.

Question. I leave those points garrisoned, but only with such garrisons as could be spared and yet preserve the Army of the Ohio with such force that it would be able to cope with the opposing army.

My opinion would be to oppose this army and not drive it into Kentucky, where they could get supplies, stores, and recruits. We see the consequence of a portion of this army getting into Kentucky, where they destroyed the railroad bridges, took a great deal of property, got some recruits, and furnished themselves with stores and supplies to get out of the State again. Another reason for passing this force would be that unless it was done they would be between the Army of the Ohio and its base of supplies, and they must be driven from the base or it must be reached in some other way. The movement made by Bragg is one almost without a parallel. Cutting loose from his base of supplies and skedaddling all over the country is something to which history scarcely a parallel, and it might well puzzle a general wishing to attack him to ferret out his movements. The supposition was that when he was cut off from his base of supplies we had him; but it seems he never lived so well as he did after he arrived in Kentucky.

Question. Would or would not the rebel army be in greater jeopardy in Kentucky, opposed by the forces that were being concentrated there to meet it, than in Middle Tennessee, where it was only opposed by a portion of that force?

Yes, sir; it would. Yet such is the nature of the country, that if the rebel army did not choose to stay in Kentucky there were routes by which it could extricate itself, notwithstanding the Army of the Ohio and the forces already concentrated; that is, if they did not choose to stand and give battle.

Question. Mention those routes, if you please.

In the first place, if Bragg had crossed the Kentucky River he could then have united with Kirby Smith and passed out of the State by Pound Gap with safety. There is another route by which he did go out, and that I have never yet seen any means of preventing, and that is by Cumberland, Big Creek, and Walker's Gaps. By