nature of the country. It would have been necessary for Bragg to have passed directly across General Buell's front in order to place his army upon our line of march, or tom make so large a detour around by Bardstown pike as to give us more than ample time to form a junction. Had Bragg attempted this he would have been directly between the two armies and in the angle formed by Salt River and the Ohio,and from this position it would have been impossible to extricate himself. There are no roads suitable for movements of an army between the Salt River and the Bardstown pike, after leaving Louisville a few miles, till you approach the neighborhood of Elizabethtown.

Question. Had this junction been attempted what would have prevented Kirby Smith occupying Louisville and destroying the canal,&c.?

Nothing particular; that is just what I should have wanted him to have done had he come to Louisville; that times means we would have force him to a junction. We were afraid that Smith would try to keep open the route to Frankfort, in order to make his own escape. Has Smith moved on Louisville and had the junction of our forces been completed the entire rebel army, including Bragg's and Smith's, would certainly have been bagged in the angle formed by the Kentucky and the Ohio. By Smith's remaining in Central Kentucky he could have escaped at any time either by Pound Gap or Cumberland Gap, or as Bragg up he would have passed out of the State at New Haven.

Question. Bragg, you say, left Battle Creek direct for Glasgow; what object had he in view in making that march?

Well, sir, he had two objects. In the first place, there were two objective points, which he undoubtedly amply considered, and one of the great objects he was in hopes of accomplishing. The objective point was the city of Nashville and the second Kentucky. By this flank march of his he evidently intended, if possible, to force the evacuation of Nashville. Should he not succeed in this, however, he would move directly for Kentucky, thereby drawing the great bulk of our forces in that direction. Had General Buell been forced to evacuate Nashville for want of subsistence and supplies the first objective point was carried,the result being to relieve Tennessee of the possession of the Federal troops. Fortunately, however, we had both rations and force sufficient to hold Nashville and at the same time take care of Bragg. Had General Buell marched at Nashville with his entire force, supposing that he had subsistence, Bragg would have moved on his communications into Kentucky and taken Louisville and Cincinnati, the consequence of which you can all judge.

Question. Had Bragg made a successful stand at Munfordville would he not have accomplished both objects?

For him to have made a successful stand at Munfordville it would have been necessary for General Buell to have offered him battle. I believe I stated previously that it would not have been judicious for him to have done so, but to have passed Bragg and drawn him from his stronghold rather to fight an unequal battle. Had Bragg overthrown General Buell or held him in check it certainly must have caused the destruction of his army. As to whatever he had force sufficient to return and besiege Nashville and at the same time carry on operations in Kentucky is very doubtful. Under those circumstances General Buell would have been forced to have passed him, which had he done or attempted to do Bragg would have been forced to move. At the time General Buell got in his rear the order of things would have been reversed and Bragg's army would have been destroyed.

Question. You say it is contrary to the maxim and science of war to divide your force. Which was better, to leave 20,000 in Nashville or to throw 10,000 into Munfordville?

You must develop that question. I must say it is not clear.

Question. Which would to better, to divide the Army of the Ohio between Bowling Green and Nashville or between Bowling Green and Munfordville?

Well, with Nashville in General Buell's rear and Bragg on his flank and rather in advance, certainly it would be much safer to leave a force in Nashville than it would to send forward a force of 10,000 men to Munfordville, when Bragg's army was much nearer to it than he was himself with his main body. In my judgment 20,000 men are better anywhere than 10,000.

Question. Suppose General Buell had promptly massed his army at