Lebanon or Gallatin directly after Bragg passed out of the Sequatchie passed out of the Sequatchie Valley at or near Sparta, would he not have ordered Nashville and blocked Bragg's progress into Kentucky by way of Munfordville?

It occurs to me that this is supposing an impossibility. The supplies of the Army of the Ohio were in Nashville it being its base. Bragg occupying the road spoken of, could it have been possible for him to have massed them there? I should say yes, though I do not see myself how it could have been done. To march on a road to a certain point it is very necessary to get possession of it is very necessary to get possession of it before the enemy does. Whether that was possible, not being there at the time, I am unprepared to say. I have heard it stated, though, by officers of the Army of the Ohio that the Army of the Ohio was forced by the Nashville route for two reasons: first for supplies, and, second to lace it in a defensive condition, as it was not their object to give it up if it could possibly be avoided. Furthermore, those routes are as follows: The direct route, the one that Bragg took, was a chord of a circle, while the route via Nashville was the circle itself, the latter much longer.

Question. Do you recollect the names of those officers of the Army of the Ohio who gave you that information?

Colonel Fry I know was one, and I think General Crittenden; but it is almost impossible for me to call names. I have talked with the general officers upon his campaign and subject a great deal, but I cannot say positively whether with this or that one. I talked a great deal with Colonel Fry, because he knew as much, perhaps more, than most of them.

Question. Allowing Generals Thomas, McCook, Negley, Wood, and other general officers who participated on the field and in all movements of the army to be equally proficient with yourself in the science of war would not those officers be better able to explain the movements, plans, &c., of the campaign in Kentucky and Tennessee than yourself?

I must say that I do not see the advantages on either side particularly. They should be quite as much so, but I do not know particularly that they should be any more so. It does not follow, Mr. Judge-Advocate, neither is it important or necessary for an officer to tread over every acre of ground or to be there on the spot with an army to comprehend the plans of the campaign, the movements, or the reasons for those movements. Some of the worst descriptions of battles and campaigns I have received were from persons who were all through them. It depends a great deal upon the commander. Some commanders are always calling councils of war; others act upon their own judgment, give their order, and hold themselves responsible for them. General McCook told me on one occasion that he never know what General Buell was going to do. Again, the duties of a commander on the field with the troops are very arduous, or should be, if he takes good care of them.

Question. Are not the actual circumstances attending a campaign so varied and expanded and the maxims of war so numerous that a supposable case gives little or no light?

The rules and maxims of war, combined with experience such as a commander should have, may be fixed and infallible, and all the great disasters that have happened to armies have originated in nineteen cases out of twenty, I will venture to say, by deviating from them. When a general knows his front of operations, the configuration of the country, the strength of the enemy, and his capacity as a commander, the strength and quality of his troops, he is almost perfectly prepared to foresee and anticipate everything material that should take place. Those circumstances which appear to the casual or unprofessional soldier to be accidental are but the incidents and circumstances brought about by the different movements, such as feints, threats, marches, counter-marches, and many of the ways which are at the disposal of the contestants.

Question. Was not Bragg's extraordinary march in and out of Kentucky in violation of the more important maxims of war; and was not the attempt to meet him by the strict adherence to such maxims of war a hinderance to our success?

The march of Bragg was certainly a very extraordinary one. After he found he could not force the evacuation of Nashville he certainly did violate, to a certain extent, some of the fundamental rules of war; but he had in justification the fact of his