Question. Supposing Bragg's army at Chattanooga could have whipped the Army of the Ohio at any time it was so disposed, was not that a very unwise disposition of General Buell's forces, exposing them constantly to attack before they could have time to concentrate to repel it?

I do not see that by that disposition of General Buell's army it was in the power of Bragg to force General Buell into a fight before he could concentrate his army on the road or near his line of communication. Any disposition of his army that would have enabled Bragg to force him into a fight, supposing that Bragg could have whipped General Buell's army, would have been bad. But it seems to me in the case supposed, and as the troops were disposed, the those most advanced in General Buell's army might have retired, and that he could have concentrated his army as he actually did.

Question. If the Army of the Ohio had been fairly concentrated at any point convenient for action, and such as might have been selected by General Buell at his leisure, between Chattanooga and Nashville or between Chattanooga and the Cumberland River on the road to Kentucky, do you believe that Bragg could have whipped that army?

I do not, sir. I believe that that army could have whipped Bragg. I think that's a great army.

Question. If such was your belief, what necessity was there for General Buell's falling back on the defensive at any time?

I do not consider that General Buell did fall back on the defensive at any time, except in so far as he was defending his line of communication, already cut. I consider that General Buell was forced to protect that line of communication, because by that he derived all his supplies; and that he was moving back on his line of communication, ready at any time to fight Bragg if he came to that line; and that he could not go in pursuit of Bragg to force him into a fight, because of his want of supplies. That is my impression.

Question. With his line of communication reaching from Louisville to Nashville and from Nashville to Murfreesborough and from there to Stevenson, his army being distributed on a line from Stevenson to McMinnville, was not that line of communication constantly and continually exposed to precisely the kind of attack that Morgan, Kirby Smith, and Bragg afterward made upon him?

It is a very long line, and I think was always very much exposed, necessarily so. With that disposition of troops from Stevenson to McMinnville I do not think the line was exposed to an attack from Bragg; that is to say, it would be very difficult for General Bragg to get at the line without encountering General Buell. It was certainly exposed to Morgan before that disposition of the troops was made. The troops I believe were on the march, before they reached Stevenson, when Morgan had cut the road. I am not sure about the dates. At all events the upper part of the line was exposed to Kirby Smith and to light troops or cavalry that moved rapidly.

Question. Except such cover as was afforded by General Morgan at Cumberland Gap, was it not known to every intelligent man in the Army of the Ohio, and of course to General Buell, that Kentucky was left almost naked of troops?

I do not know myself what number of troops were in Kentucky, but supposed very few. I cannot say what the opinion of the intelligent officers in the army was with reference to that; but intelligent officers in the army generally acquaint themselves with the locality of any considerable bodies of troops, and I dare say many of them were better posted in regard to the forces in Kentucky than I was myself. I supposed there were but few there, though I did not know. I was very anxious about Kentucky, and feared that she going to have a very hard time when I heard that Kirby Smith was there; but that was not until I reached Murfreesborough.

Question. If General Buell believed that the Army of the Ohio could not take Chattanooga, distributed as it was, did it not become a mere army of observation?