I cannot say that. General Buell might have undertaken some other enterprise that he considered feasible if the thought he could not take Chattanooga. If the army had remained in that position and undertaken no other enterprise, I should have considered it posted just to watch the movements of Bragg.

Question. Supposing it to have degenerated into an army of observation, to prevent, if possible, the foray into Kentucky or a march of the enemy against Nashville, where, in your judgment, was its true point of observation?

If General Buell had been simply undertaking to cover Kentucky and Nashville, I should think that a portion of his army, disposed as it was, would be somewhat out of place. I was not sufficiently acquainted with all the roads to say where perhaps would have been the true point of observation, but perhaps from McMinnville or from Sparta even to McMinnville and Murfreesborough. This is from a general recollection of the roads on the map. I suppose in those positions he would be enabled to throw himself between Bragg and either one of the points at his option. This is supposing Bragg to be at Chattanooga.

Question. Can you state with any certainty, general, how far Bragg's army had progressed en route for Kentucky before General Buell commenced his concentration of troops at Murfreesborough for the purpose of retiring to Nashville?

I cannot tell for a certainty. My impression is when I received orders to march to Pelham and on to Murfreesborough-which I now suppose was for the purpose of concentrating the army at Murfreesborough-General Bragg was either in the Sequatchie Valley or was coming down into the valley. I will not be positive about the date, but I think I got the order to move about the 24th or 25th of August.

Question. If the Army of the Ohio, instead of being posted from Stevenson to McMinnville, had been posted on the line between McMinnville and Sparta, with Collins Creek and Caney Fork for its front, would it not have effectually covered Nashville and at the same time been in position, if it could have whipped Bragg's army, to have pursued and overtaken Bragg's army before it crossed the Cumberland River; that is, supposing that army could have got by its flank?

I suppose, with the army posted at that point, that Bragg passing anywhere near to the army he could have been forced to fight before he crossed the Cumberland River; but I could not say, unless some point were designated showing the distance between the armies when it did pass the flank, whether they would have had to fight on the south side of the Cumberland or whether he would have had time to cross it. It would have been in a position I think to cover Nashville, and in a position to whip Bragg's army, supposing Bragg's army to have come near enough to that position to enable General Buell to force him into a fight.

Question. If the purpose was simply to hold Bragg with his army in Chattanooga what is the objection to taking up a position with the Army of the Ohio concentrated close to the Tennessee River on the north bank in front of Chattanooga; and in that event and with that disposition would not the Tennessee have been a very serious obstacle to Bragg's front and a very great advantage to our army?

The objection would be the want of supplies and the difficulty of getting them into that position. I think the Tennessee River would have been a very considerable obstacle.

Question. You see no objection to it, then, expect the difficulty of getting supplies to the army at such a point?

I can think of no other objection.

Question. At any time after 4 o'clock on the day of the battle of Perryville what was there to have prevented you from cutting off the enemy's retreat while they were engaged driving McCook's corps and how long would such a movement on your part have required; that is, could you have accomplished it before night, supposing this driving of