scarcely anything else, but in the spring of 1862 the farmers had planted corn. After exhausting all the old corn we could find in the country we had to use green corn, not only for the animals, but is comprised a large portion of the food of the troops. I mention this particularly to account for the scarcity of grain in that part of the country, and that was about the extreme range of the movements of our foraging trains. From Duck River to the cumberland north the country had been thoroughly foraged by the forces at Nashville and occupying our line of communication.

When General Buell's headquarters were moved from Huntsville to Decherd Station, on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, on or about August 20 or 21, the supply of rations in the hands of the troops and at the stations between Nashville and Stevenson, all points south of Nashville, Athens, Columbia, and Franklin - was 628 [?] half rations. One week before that movement of General Buell to Decherd Station the following is the report of stores at Nashville: 300,000 rations of salt meat, 700,000 rations of hard bread and flour. Salt meat, as you will see by the figures, was largely inferior to the quantity of breadstuffs. This was owing to the difficulty of procuring fresh meat. the beef contractions of the army having met with heavy losses in the capture of herds of cattle by the guerrillas, I was ordered on our arrival at Huntsville to use every effort to absorb the resources of the country in fresh meat, and for that purpose all the cattle that could be heathered from Southern Kentucky and around Nashville and between Nashville and Huntsville were diligently sought after. In the movements of abandoning our line of communications in Northern Alabama and on the road between Nashville and Huntsville were diligently sought after. In the movement of abandoning our line of communications in Northern Alabama and on the road between Nashville and Huntsville were diligently sought after. In the movement of abandoning our line of communications in Northern Alabama and on the road between Columbia and Decatur all the other stores were carefully gathered up and sent northward, and in no case was anything lost except at Huntsville, where only a small quantity was lost. We succeeded in bringing everything safely forward. We arrived at Decherd Station, I think, on about the 21st or 22nd of August, where we established our headquarters. While there I was ordered by General Buell to take four companies of cavalry and to thoroughly scour the north and south bank of Elk River as far as Fayetteville, and to bring in all the cattle that could be found, to ascertain what resources were still left in that region, as that was considered the best part of the country. I was absent five days and returned with 200 head of cattle, which was every poor condition could be gathered up on both banks of the river; but they were in very poor condition, so as hardly to justify the trip. I found in all the farms and plantations but a few funded barrels of flour, a part of which proved afterward to be damaged. All this was brought forward and went toward Nashville with the movement of the army.

On our arrival at Nashville, about September 2, the following was the amount of stores on hand. I forgot to mention that already in July the commissary in Nashville was ordered to take all the supplies in the hands of dealers in Nashville, and all shipments of supplies out of Nashville on private account were stopped. I mention this to account for the enormous quantity of one item - salt - included in the following statement.

On the 1st of September the following was the condition of supplies in Nashville about the time our columns marched into the city: 345,000 rations of salt meats, 200 head of beef cattle, 1,000,000 rations of breadstuffs. The disproportion between breadstuffs and salt meats will account for our efforts to obtain all the fresh beef possible. Of salt Captain Macfeely had seized 5,000 barrels. That was the large item spoken of. I mention that because it might be thought we had taken up unnecessary transportation for the supply of this article, whereas that was taken from private parties. Constant complaint was made by our officer at Nashville of the inadequate means of transportation on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. In order that no time should be lost and that no means should be left unused, Captain W. Frank Harris, assistant quartermaster of volunteers in our command, and who at on time had been an agent on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and was thoroughly posted in railroad matters, had been sent up to Louisville in the month of July with full powers to run the railroad to its utmost capacity. With all his efforts the railroad was unable to carry more than about 75 tons per day. This of course included not only subsistence but forage and quartermaster's supplies. In the mean time, discovering that subsistence was more requisite than that of forage, because our troops were making free use of the green corn in the fields, all the railroad transportation was applied to bringing subsistence. To provide for our march northward from Nashville in pursuit of Bragg, and at the same time of leave Nashville in as well supplied condition as possible, General Buell had ordered 1,000,000 of rations to Bowling Green, not only by railroad but by way of Green River.

The condition of our troops about September 1, when they reached Nashville on their march northward, was as follows (I have already stated the supplies at Nashville): General Crittenden's division had 20,000 rations of breadstuffs, but not so