much of other articles; General McCook's train had forty days' rations complete; the Third Division, formerly commanded by General Mitchell, had 72,00 rations of breadstuffs only; the Fourth Division, formerly commanded by General Nelson, had 50,000 rations; General Wood's division had 36,000 rations of breadstuffs; and as General Thomas' division was over near McMinnville, I had sent him on about the last of August 35,000 rations. Besides these reations mentioned the troops had three days' rations on their persons, enough to allow them to reach Nashville. Besides these supplies mentioned as on hand at Nashville about September 1 and in the wagons of the division trains, I had sent to Nashville, and there were then in the depots there and en route in the cars waiting to be unloaded, 430,000 rations of breadstuffs, but nothing else. This, with the quantity on hand at Nashville, would give 1,100,000 rations of breadstuffs. General Buell ordered me to provide for the troops as far as Bowling Green on half rations, in order that we might leave every available and possible pound of supplies in Nashville, as we expected communication to be cut off in our rear with or forces left there. The troops were so supplied until we reached Bowling Green we were expecting to find the million rations ordered by General Buell beforehand for this emergency. The supplies which were taken with us from Nashville were exhausted.

On investigating the condition of supplies at Bowling Green I discovered that the essential parts of the rations ordered by General Buell were almost totally wanting, the inadequate power of the railroad to transport them in time. I found that no breadstuffs whatever were on hand, with the exception of a few barrels of flour and those not sufficient for the troops garrisoning Bowling Green for over four or five days. The meat rations amounted of only about one-third of the quantity ordered. It was necessary to halt the command and obtain sufficient sullies of meat and breadstuffs. Trains were immediately organized and sent out to gather all the wheat and flour in the surrounding country. Trains went as far as 20 and 25 miles westward in the direction of Russellville. Here we met the same difficulty in obtaining supplies, on account of the previous occupation of Bowling Green by the rebels and of the destitute condition in which they had left the people. I called upon the citizens of Bowling Green and induced them to send messengers throughout the country, promising immediate payment for all the wheat brought to the mills and for all the flour brought to Bowling Green. All the mills that could be put into operation within 18 miles around Bowling Green to the westward were put in operation, and by this means in about four or five days I had gathered about 400,000 rations of flour. Of salt meat I was unable to obtain more than about 10,000 rations. Upon the arrival of our troops at Munfordville the railroad trains from Bowling Green under my care were run to Munfordville day and night, supplying the troops as they passed Munfordville with provisions gathered in the manner I have stated. On the arrival of our troops at West Point, at the mouth of Salt River, on the Ohio River, provisions which had been ordered from Louisville down to West Point met us. One of the divisions, commanded by General Smith, formerly of the division of General Nelson, had been out of provisions for nearly a day where they arrived there. All the supplies that were left at Bowling Green of the quantity gathered in the manner I have stated were intended to be pushed into Nashville at the first favorable opportunity. When I left Bowling Green I so instructed the commissary there. During our march northward, according to my instructions, I used every effort to supply Nashville, even stinting the troops on the march, to that in case communication should be cut off with that city we had left everything possible with them.

We reached Louisville about the latter part of September. The troops on our arrival there were ordered to send in their trains and supply themselves with provisions immediately for then days, so as to be able to march at an hour's notice. Arrangements were made also to supply the columns marching from Louisville in pursuit of Bragg at the rate of 100,000 rations per day.

The troops left Louisville about the 1 st of October, marching in three different columns, by three different roads and routes, intending to concentrate in front of the enemy at or near Danville. The raids of the rebels under Kirby Smith by way of Frankfort, in the rear of the columns of General McCook, seriously impeded the movements of our trains following his columns to supply him, and they were consequently ordered from their route, barely in time to save them from the enemy, by way of Bardstown. It was a difficult matter to supply the troops on this march for these reasons: the Louisville and Nashville Railroad was destroyed; several important bridges burned on the main stem; the Bardstown branch was completely destroyed in every vulnerable point, as also the principal bridges on the Lebanon branch, which made it necessary to depend upon wagons alone from Louisville. Desiring to make use of the railroad as far as was in our power, the construction of the Frankfort Railroad and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and its branches was pushed with the greatest energy. The raid of Kirby Smith in the rear of General McCook's column