706 Series I Volume XVI-I Serial 22 - Morgan's First Kentucky Raid, Perryville Campaign Part I
Page 706 | KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. |
[CHAP. XXVIII.
for the safety of Wood's division if it should be left scattered along the railroad at the work required of it after the rest of the army had crossed the river. It was therefore doubted whether if the ferry could have been completed in less time than it was it would have been judicious to cross until Wood's division had pushed so far along toward Decatur as to be out of danger. A demonstration actually made upon the line by the enemy was checked or watched by the movement of a division from Corinth under the orders of General Halleck. The divisions of the Army of the Ohio at the time of crossing the Tennessee at Florence averaged a little less than 6,000 effectives. The crossing was commenced on the 23rd and continued as rapidly as the troops could take up the line of march with proper intervals on the opposite side, Nelson's division being brought forward from Iuka to the ferry. Baggage was reduced at Florence before crossing, the surplus being sent off by water. All the wagons that could be spared from the troops were sent from Florence to Reynolds' Station to haul supplies over the break in the Nashville and Decatur road, a break of about 40 miles by the route which had to be taken. The leading division (McCook's) camped near Huntsville on the 28th of June; the other two (Crittenden's and Nelson's) were at prescribed distances in rear. The distance marched in the twenty-four days between the 4th and 28th of June was about 150 miles. During this time the ferry was constructed on the Tennessee River, and the troops, animals, and wagons crossed by means of it. I am therefore of opinion that the march was prosecuted with industry and energy. Among the causes of the delay, if there is deemed to have been any delay in the march herein referred to, may be mentioned the suffering of the troops and animals from extreme heat and from dust and a scarcity of water. During all this march forage was obtained from the country.
Question. After the arrival of the four divisions of the Army of the Ohio in North Alabama, about the last of June, what further obstacles were to be overcome in a farther advance upon Chattanooga; what supplies could be procured in the country through which the army had to march; what difficulties interfered with the ready procuring of supplies from Louisville or other points where they could he obtained; what were the natural obstacles to be overcome between North Alabama and Chattanooga; what measures were taken to overcome the difficulties above alluded to; were those measures prosecuted with zeal and energy; and, under the circumstances, was it possible for the army to pursue its march uninterruptedly to Chattanooga, its point of destination?
The Third brigade of Wood's division did not complete its labor on the railroad and cross the Tennessee River until about the 6th of July. The further obstacles to be overcome in a farther advance on Chattanooga were a want of supplies and a want of means to procure them. The country between Huntsville and Chattanooga is poor; in fact is almost destitute of supplies. No provisions of consequence could be obtained, and forage enough to subsist the animals in the move could not have been procured along the line. It was expected that the railroad to Nashville would have been completed by 1st of July. General Mitchel reported that such would be the case, but it was not so, and the ready procurement of supplies from Nashville was prevented by the condition of the railroads; supplies did not go from Louisville to Nashville as rapidly as they should have done for some reason not known. The commissary at Louisville reported that he could send but 75,000 rations per day over the Louisville and Nashville road. That was not more than the daily consumption. I know the accumulation at Nashville was not as rapid as it should have been. No proper effort seemed to have been made in North Alabama before the arrival of General Buell to hasten and husband the supplies from Louisville or gather the few which were in the country, and I am satisfied that army transportation, which should have been hauling corn from the country and provisions over the break in the railroad, was hauling cotton, and that this cotton passing over railroads under military control interfered with the accumulation of supplies in anticipation of the arrival in North Alabama of the forces under General Buell. The natural obstacles to be overcome between North Alabama and Chattanooga were the Tennessee River (which had to be bridged, as there was no means of constructing an adequate ferry) and the broken nature of the country. All the material for a bridge had to be got out of the standing timber, and the work done by men not schooled in that species of labor. This required some time, and the labor was prosecuted with zeal and energy. All the spare wagons in the army were necessary in hauling supplies over the break in the railroad heretofore mentioned. No advance from the Tennessee River could therefore be made until the break was repaired, so as to release the wagons and leave them free for hauling from the depot at Stevenson or the river to supply the army as it moved forward. South of the river, an the line to Chattanooga the country is very barren and broken; the roads
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