are difficult; the march of an army over them would necessarily be slow and its progress could readily be impeded by a very inferior force. Supplies and transportation and means of crossing the river were [not] there, being absolutely necessary in an advance on Chattanooga, and it was impossible for the army to have pursued its march uninterruptedly to Chattanooga. It may be proper to state that there was not much subsistence in North Alabama, and what there was was so scattered as to render it impracticable for a concentrated army to gather enough for its daily use. There was no salt meat, but few cattle, and the corn was standing in fields often at a considerable distance from each other.

Question. When did the division of General Thomas join the army in North Alabama and what delayed its arrival? Pending the preparation to advance on Chattanooga, and before the rebel army crossed the Tennessee River in force, what were the operations of the enemy's cavalry on the lines of communication of the army and with what effect, and what dispositions were made of the troops comprising the army; for what reasons and with what object?

The division of General Thomas joined the army in North Alabama on the 2nd or 3rd of August. I understand its arrival to have been delayed because it was deemed necessary to keep it west of the river. On the 30th of June General Halleck telegraphed General Buell that General Thomas' division could not join him, and that he (General Halleck) might have to take another division from General Buell. I understood this to be in consequence of some orders or contemplated orders for the movement of a large part of General Halleck's force to some other field of operations. Pending the preparation to advance on Chattanooga the enemy's cavalry and guerrillas operated boldly and effectively on the lines of communication of the army. The first bridge was destroyed on or about the 9th of July, and from this time to the end of the campaign the road was destroyed almost as fast as it was repaired. On the 13th of July the enemy's cavalry captured our forces at Murfreesborough and destroyed the road the next day after it was in running order for the first time. Other less important breaks were made and important bridges were twice injured by floods. The success of the enemy's cavalry at Murfreesborough not only destroyed the Chattanooga Railroad just completed and disorganized our forces at that place, but endangered Nashville. The dispositions made on this account were to send one division and all the available cavalry from the main army to Murfreesborough via Nashville. The reasons for this were that the state of affairs required it, and in addition to this General Halleck telegraphed that these raids should be stopped even if the Chattanooga expedition had to be delayed. The object was to re-establish the line of communication and establish a force at McMinnville to cover this line and Nashville. The brigade captured or broken up at Murfreesborough was to have taken post at McMinnville for this purpose. The cavalry was to operate directly against that of the enemy. It was found impracticable to hold the road against large columns of cavalry, with field batteries, by small infantry posts, however well intrenched. After capturing Murfreesborough and disposing of the prisoners and stores the enemy's cavalry proceeded to the Louisville and Nashville road, captured a regiment of infantry at Gallatin on the 10th of August, and soon after met and defeated our cavalry column, and were thus at liberty to complete the destruction of our lines and ride over Kentucky. In answer to that part of this question which calls for a statement as to the effect of these operations I will state that in my opinion they constrained, in fact controlled, all the subsequent operations of the Army of the Ohio, for they cut it off from its depots, and it was not possible for the army to maneuver in the face of an enemy equal or superior in numbers and gather its supplies daily from the fields in a sparsely settled country, even if the country afforded enough.

Question. When were the railroads from Nashville to the Tennessee River completed; what further preparations were made to advance, and why did not the Army of the Ohio then at once advance on Chattanooga?

The first freight train passed from Nashville to Stevenson on 28th July. Supplies were immediately sent by rail to Stevenson which was selected as the depot for the advance on Chattanooga and further detailed preparations made for the advance. On the 10th of August, however, as previously stated, the post of Gallatin was captured and our cavalry soon after defeated and the Louisville and Nashville road completely destroyed, and a large cavalry force of the enemy was in Kentucky and not an adequate amount of supplies in Nashville. It was also known at this time that the enemy was strong at Chattanooga. Not more than four divisions (Thomas', Wood's,,