[CHAP. XXVIII.

McCook's, and Crittenden's), could have been carried against him at this time. If the condition of affairs in our rear had permitted the advance I do not think this force was sufficient at this time.

Question. From what points did the rebel forces come which were collected to oppose the advance of the Army of the Ohio into East Tennessee; by what means were they moved, and, considering the railroad facilities which the enemy possessed, what was the probability of his being able to concentrate at Chattanooga all his available force not required for defense at other points before the Army of the Ohio could march to that point from Corinth, a distance of-miles, crossing the Tennessee River twice by means which had to be created?

The rebel forces collected at Chattanooga to resist the advance of the Army of the Ohio came mainly from Northern Mississippi (from Beauregard's Corinth army). The infantry moved by railroad;the cavalry and part of the artillery marched. I have no doubt of the enemy's ability to have concentrated at Chattanooga or any other point in Tennessee all the forces he could spare from other operations before the Army of the Ohio could march from Corinth to the point in question, it having to march 200 miles and cross the Tennessee River twice by means which it had to create, the second crossing being probably opposed by the enemy.

Question. Under such circumstances what probability was there of the successful advance of 25,000 or even 30,000 men into East Tennessee unless the enemy was occupied by offensive operations at other vital points, and to what extent, as far as you know, was the large force of the enemy which retired from Corinth so occupied while the advance toward East Tennessee was being made?

Under the foregoing circumstances I think there was no probability of a successful advance of 25,000 or even 30,000 men into East Tennessee unless the enemy should be so occupied at other points as to be unable to spare troops to oppose this advance. To the best of my knowledge and belief the force of the enemy which withdrew from Corinth was not to occupied as to prevent its concentration for the purpose named, and I am satisfied that not as much as four regiments of that army was sent to Virginia.

Question. When did the rebel forces in East Tennessee commence their advance; at what points were they understood to have crossed the Tennessee River; what, according to the best information, was their immediate object; what route or routes did they intend to pursue, and what steps were taken by the commander of the Army of the Ohio to oppose the designs of the enemy?

From my recollection of the best information received at the time I should say the rebel forces in East Tennessee commenced their advance early in August. They were understood to have crossed the Tennessee River at Harrison, Blythe's Ferry, and Kingston. Their immediate object was understood to be the reoccupation of Middle Tennessee and capture of Nashville. The evidence on this point was as strong as could well be obtained on such a subject. There was a reason to believe that they would pass into the Sequatchie Valley by the Poe and Anderson roads, and move thence down the valley by Jasper and Battle Creek or continue on the Poe and Anderson roads and pass by Atlamont or McMinnville, and thence by Winchester. Steps as follows were taken by the commander of the Army of the Ohio to oppose the design of the enemy. The Decatur road was abandoned; two divisions (Nelson's and Wood's) were sent to McMinnville; two (McCook's and Crittenden's) were already at Battle Creek; one (Schoepf's) was near Decherd, and the other (Rousseau's) was in part at Decherd and in part guarding the Chattanooga Railroad. After the movements to take these positions were completed and before the enemy had commenced to cross to the Sequatchie Valley the two divisions at Battle Creek were ordered to dispense with baggage, take only enough wagons to gather supplies, and move up the Sequatchie Valley, which is productive, subsist themselves on the valley as far as possible, and take a strong position near them, so as to control the valley and render the enemy's retreat to it unsafe. If forced back, these divisions were to retire on the Therman road via Altamont and join the main army. This movement was commenced, but the senior general received information which led him to fear that it could not be completed in time, and he abandoned it and returned to Battle Creek and moved thence to Altamont. When it was known that the enemy was not going