Swords, assistant quartermaster-general, "We are in want of everything; we are destitute of forageJanuary

That on the 21st of July, 1862, Chief Engineer Craighill, detailed for service at the Gap from the Regular Army, telegraphed to Brigadier-General Totten at Washington City, "The country in our rear is exhausted; that in our front soon will beJanuary

That on the 23rd of July I telegraphed to the Secretary of War and to General Buell, "My supplies are very shortJanuary

That on the 29th of July, in my letter of instructions to Chief Engineer Craighill, about to proceed to General Halleck's headquarters, I stated that "East Tennessee and Kentucky to the blue-grass region are exhausted." (The former had been ravaged by the enemy.)

That on the 10th of August I telegraphed to the Secretary of War and to General Buell, "I have about three weeks' suppliesJanuary

That on the 16th of August I telegraphed to the Secretary of War and to General Buell, "Smith cannot possibly remain three weeks in my rear, while I can hold this place five weeks with my present command." (I did hold the Gap four weeks and five days from the date of that dispatch.)

That on the 19th of August I telegraphed General Halleck that "150 wagons laden with forage and subsistence have arrived." Those supplies were principally of forage, which had been hauled over 100 miles, and as the teams had to be fed while on the road from the wagons the amount was greatly reduced.

Here then is the proof that General Halleck was informed of my true condition, and that if he had the means to have given me relief, as he says he "might have done," he is beyond all doubt responsible for the loss of Cumberland Gap.

General Halleck says that "the Government believed that Cumberland Gap would form a serious obstacle to the retreat of the enemy." If the administration so believed it was the duty of General Halleck to have corrected so erroneous an impression. He was aware that I had invaded East Tennessee in June, 1862, through two other gaps, and that Kirby Smith had invaded Kentucky by the same routes during the August following. Hence, even had General Halleck furnished me with supplies, as he says he might have done, the forces of Bragg and Smith would have retreated by two or three roads instead of by one.

It was not by my order that Kentucky was denuded of troops nor through my neglect that Rogers' and Big Creek Gaps were left incitingly open to invasion. In obedience to instructions from the Secretary of War I kept him advised of my movements, and on the 11th of May, 1862, and twice afterward, I suggested the importance of protecting the lines of communication between Louisville and Nashville and between Lexington and Cumberland Ford; and afterward I strongly recommended the occupation of the last-named gaps. But neither gap was occupied and both lines were left unprotected; the cavalry I had repeatedly asked for was not furnished me, and the natural results of the weakened and exposed condition of Kentucky were the raids of John Morgan and the invasion by Smith and Bragg.

Regarding the occupation of East Tennessee as of vital importance, in vain I made every effort to have a rail or other good military road constructed to Cumberland Gap, from thence to be extended to intersect the great road from Richmond which connects East Tennessee with Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.

East Tennessee is overwhelming devoted to the Union, and with proper cultivation is capable of feeding its own population and an