army of 150,000 men. Once in our possession the rebels would be compelled to evacuate Virginia, for they would be cut off from their only practicable route to the Gulf States, and have lost the vast supplies, upon which they so much depend, from Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas.

Three times I earnestly requested to be allowed to advance upon Knoxville, and pledged myself to sweep East Tennessee from Bristol to Chattanooga. I had surplus arms for six additional regiments of patriotic Tennesseans. I could have destroyed all communications with Virginia until Buell could have advanced from the Southwest, but I was ordered not to act on the offensive, and Buell was not allowed to attack Bragg near Chattanooga while I advanced against Kirby Smith upon Knoxville. Had not these plans been interfered with the invasion of Kentucky would not have taken place and East Tennessee and Cumberland Gap would be in our possession to-day.

General Halleck complains that I was "almost boastful" in my confidence "that I could hold my position against any number of troops which the enemy could bring against me." There was a stern necessity for a tone of confidence upon my part, for I had reason to know that there was panic from Washington to Louisville. And although cut off from supplies and threatened by a force vastly greater than my own my command maintained a "boastful confidence" and sought to inspire at least a moderate degree elsewhere. In answer to an official telegram I said:

I am surprised to hear that there is consternation at Louisville or elsewhere. Here [Cumberland Gap] all is quiet and orderly. We are prepared for the enemy whenever he may show himself.

The enemy did show himself and the result proved that we were ready to receive him. During the thirty-two days that we were invested we captured over 500 officers and soldiers, making an equivalent of 542 privates, and killed or wounded 170, making an aggregate loss of over 700 on his part against a loss of less than 40 on our side. These facts were duly reported.

On the 19th of August I telegraphed to General Halleck:

This position shall not be yielded while we have a pound of meat or an ounce of powder. But I trust that the road may soon be opened by a column from Lexington.

General Halleck replied:

I will see that you are very soon re-enforced.

His promises only resulted in defeat and disaster to our arms. On the 19th of August his re-enforcements were driven from Big Hill; on the 30th of the same month they were routed at Richmond, and on the 2d of September in hot haste he abandoned Lexington and Frankfort, and retreated to Covington and Louisville; and Bragg maintained his position in the blue-grass region, more than 100 miles this side of Cumberland Gap, for more than two months after General Halleck promised his speedy re-enforcements.

Inasmuch as my advance against Cumberland Gap has been made a subject of investigation before the Buell Commission, and as I have not been summoned as a witness, it is proper that I should here state a few facts, some of which were unknown to me when my official report was written.

My camp at Cumberland Ford was 14 miles north of the Gap, and to reach the Gap in front was a six hours' march. But to turn it by a flank movement by way of Big Creek Gap required from my position an almost impracticable march of ten or twelve days over a distance of