NEW YORK, April 6, 1865.

Honorable E. M. STANTON,

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a report of the military operations of my command in the Department of the Gulf, in 1862, 1863, and 1864. It is prepared by direction of the Adjutant-General. Being absent from the records, I have been unable to state as fully and as much in detail as could be desired the history of the different campaigns. After the campaign of Port Hudson the troops were engaged immediately and continuously, and the officers were for that reason unable to make detailed reports of the operations of their respective commands. I have been unable, therefore, to name the officers who deserve the consideration and favor of the Government for distinguished services, of whom there are many, and I shall ask leave to submit an additional report upon that subject. The details of the Port Hudson campaign are drawn from such publications and dispatches of the time as have been within my reach. Any error that may occur will be corrected at the earliest possible moment.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

Major-General, Commanding.

SIR: While engaged in earnest efforts to effect the capture of Galveston, with a view to those general operations contemplated for the winter campaign, I was informed by a dispatch, received January 23 and dated January 11, that "it was proposed that General Steele should advance to Red River if he could rely upon your (my) co-operation and be certain of receiving supplies on that line," and that "the best military opinion of the generals of the West seemed to favor operations on Red River, provided the stage of the water would enable the gun-boats to co-operate;" that "this would open a better theater of operations than any other for such troops as General Grant could spare during the winter." I was also informed that Major-General Grant and Major-General Steele had been written to, and I was instructed to communicate with them upon this subject.

Having made known my plan of operations on the coast, and fully stated at different times the difficulties to be encountered in movements by land in the direction of Alexandria and Shreveport, I did not feel at liberty to decline participation in the campaign, which had been pressed upon my attention from the time I was assigned to the command of this department, and which was now supported by the concurrent opinions of the general officers in the West, on account of difficulties which might be obviated by personal conference with commanders, or by orders from the General-in-Chief. It was not, however, without well-founded apprehensions of the result of the campaign, and a clear view of the measures (which I suggested) indispensable to success, that I entered upon this new campaign. The necessity of a perfect unity of command and of purpose, as well as of constant communication between the forces assigned to this duty, and then separated by hundreds of miles, was too apparent to admit of question.

I replied to this dispatch on the 23rd of January, stating that "with the forces proposed," to wit, General Sherman and General Steele and my own disposable force, I concurred in the opinion that the Red River was the shortest and best line of defense for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas, and that with