my own forces and those of General Steele and the assistance of General Sherman the success of the movements on that line might be made certain and important, and that I should cordially co-operate with them in executing the orders of the Government.

In order that the inherent difficulties attending the proposed combined movement, which had been thoroughly tested in the campaign of 1863 and 1864, and which I had represented with as much earnestness as seemed to be proper, mmight be presented in a manner most likely to gain attention, I directed Major D. C. Houston, chief engineer of the department, who possessed the highest claims to favorable consideration from professional qualifications and experience, and his acquaintance with the route, to prepare a memorial upon operations on Red River, which had been long under consideration. This was transmitted to the headquarters of the Army, and appeared to have received the attention and approval of the General-in-Chief. It stated with precision the obstacles to be encountered and the measures necessary to accomplish the object in view. No change would be required in this statement if it had been written in review rather than in anticipation of the campaign. It recommended as a condition indispensable to success, first, such complete preliminary organization as would avoid the least delay in our movements after the campaign had opened; second, that a line of supply be established from the Mississippi independent of water-courses; third, the concentration of the forces west of the Mississippi and such other force as should be assigned to this duty from General Sherman's command, in such a manner as to expel the enemy from Northern Louisiana and Arkansas; fourth, such preparation and concert of action among the different corps employed as to prevent the enemy, by keeping him constantly employed, from operating against our positions or forces elsewhere; and, fifth, that the entire force should be placed under the command of a single general.

Preparations for a long campaign were advised, and the month of May indicated as the point of time when the occupation of Shreveport might be anticipated. Not one of these suggestions, so necessary in conquering the inherent difficulties of the expedition, were carried into execution, nor was it in my power to establish them. The troops under command of General Steele were acting independently of my command, under orders not communicated to me, and at such distance that it was impossible to ascertain his movements or to inform him of my own, so that we might co-operate with or support each other. The detachment of troops from the command of Major-General Sherman, though operating upon the same line with my own, were under special orders, having ulterior objects in view, and afforded an earnest but only a partial co-operation in the expedition. The distance which separated the different commands, the impossibility of establishing necessary communications between them, the absence of a general authority to command them, the time that was required for the transmission of orders from Washington, and the necessity of immediate action on account of the condition of the rivers and operations contemplated for the armies elsewhere, gave rise to embarrassments in the organization of forces and in the execution of orders which could not be overcome.

In the instructions I received from the Government it was left to my discretion whether or not I would join in this expedition, but I was directed to communicate with General Sherman and General Steele and Admiral Porter upon the subject. I expressed the satis-