faction I should find in co-operating with them in a movement deemed of so much importance by the Government, to which my own command was unequal, and my belief that with the forces designated it would be entirely successful. Having received from them similar assurances, both my discretion and my authority, so far as the organization of the expedition was concerned, were at an end. The disposition of the enemy's forces at that time, according to the best information that could be obtained, was as follows: Magruder had about 20,000 men of all arms, of which 15,000 were serviceable. The main body covered Galveston and Houston from an anticipated movement from Matagorda Peninsula, still held by our troops. Walker's division, numbering 7,000 men, were upon the Atchafalaya and Red Rivers, from Opelousas to Fort De Russy; Mouton's division, between the Black and Washita Rivers, from Red River to Monroe, numbering 6,000 men; while Price, with two heavy divisions of infantry, estimated at 5,000, and a large cavalry force, estimated at from 7,000 to 10,000, held the country from Monroe to Camden and Arkadelphia, confronting Steele. Magruder could spare 10,000 of his force to resist an attack from the east, leaving his fortifications well garrisoned on the coast, while Price could furnish at least an additional 5,000 from the north, making a formidable army of from 25,000 to 30,000 men, equal to any forces that could be brought against them, even with the most perfect unity and co-operation of commands. This estimate of the strength of the enemy was given in my dispatch of February 2, but was thought, upon information received by the Government, to be exaggerated.

The defenses of the enemy consisted of a series of works covering the approaches to Galveston and Houston from the south, the defenses of Galveston Bay, Sabine Pass, and Sabine River, Fort De Russy, a formidable work located 3 miles from Marksville for the defense of the Red River, and extensive and formidable works at Trinity, the junction of the Tensas and Washita at Camden, commanding approaches from the north. To meet these forces of the enemy it was proposed to concentrate, in some general plan of operations, 15,000 of the troops under command of General Steele, a detachment of 10,000 from the command of General Sherman, and a force from 15,000 to 17,000 men from the Army of the Gulf, making an army of 35,000 to 37,000 men of all arms, with such gun-boats as the Navy Department should order. Orders were given to my command at once to suspend operations at Galveston, and vigorous preparations were made for the new campaign. Having been charged by the President with duties not immediately connected with military operations, but which were deemed important and required my personal attention at New Orleans, the organization of the troops of my command assigned to the expedition was intrusted to Major General W. B. Franklin. The main body of his command, consisting of the Nineteenth Corps (except Grover's division at Madisonville, which was to join him) and one division of the Thirteenth Corps, under General Ransom, were at this time on Berwick Bay, between Berwick City and Franklin, on the Bayou Teche, directly on the line of march for Alexandria and Shreveport. Small garrisons were left at Brownsville and Matagorda Bay in Texas (positions which, under instructions from the President and subsequently from Lieutenant-General Grant, were not to be abandoned), at New Orleans, and at Port Hudson, which was threatened by a vigorous and active enemy; smaller garrisons at Baton Rouge and