my depots and workshops, the loss of which would well-night have closed operations in this department? I determined upon the latter, and for the following reasons: I have stated that my original plan was if possible, to mass my whole force against a single column of the enemy. This had been done successfully against Banks. Steele was still slowly advancing from the Little Missouri to the Prairie D'Ane. I deemed it imprudent to follow Banks below Grand Ecore and leave Steele so near Shreveport. Were I able to throw Banks across the Atchafalaya, the high water of that stream would arrest my further progress. If Red River continued to fall it seemed probable that Banks would be compelled to withdraw to Alexandria. It was hoped that the falls would detain him there until we could finish Steele, when the entire force of the department would we could finish Steele, when the entire force of the department would be free to operate against him. I confidently hoped that if I could reach Steele with my infantry to beat him at a distance from his deport, in a poor country, and with my large cavalry force destroy his army. The prize would have been the Arkansas Valley and the fortifications of Little Rock, now too strong to be taken by either siege or assault with any force at my command. By the either siege or assault with any force at my command. By the time my infantry reached Shreveport Steele had moved by his left flank to Camden. He held the fortifications we had constructed there. They were strong. I cold not think of allowing Steele time to establish himself finally in Camden. I moved upon the place. The enemy abandoned it. I pursued, overtook, and beat him at the Saline. I failed to accomplish what I had reasonably hoped for, but succeeded din driving Steele from the valley of the Ouachita, with signal loss of men and material, and left myself free to move entire force to the support of Taylor.

After the enemy left Grand Ecore General Taylor attacked his rear at Cloutierville, while a part of his force held his front in check at Monett's Ferry. General Taylor's force was too weak to warrant the hope that he could successfully impede the march of Banks' column. After the latter ached Alexandria Taylor transferred part of his command to the river below Alexandria, and with unparalleled audacity and great ability so operated on the enemy's gun-boats and transports as to compel him, with a force quadruple his own, to abandon that important position. A temporary rise in Red River enabled Admiral Porter to get his fleet over the falls. Had he delayed but one week longer our whole infantry would have been with Taylor.

Some idea may be formed of the character of our operations when it is stated that Walker's division, from the opening of the campaign at Simsport to the time of its arrival at Alexandria, a period of about two months, marched 700 miles and fought three pitched battles.

Information having been received that A. J. Smith's command was proceeding up the Mississippi River, I threw Marmaduke across from Camden to dispute its progress. He attacked the fleet, disabled or destroyed three of its boats, compelled it to halt and land its infantry, which he engaged for several hours.

Here ends the campaign in which, with a force of 25,000 men, all told, in the entire department, I drove back whence they came armies 60,000 strong, supported by an enormous fleet, inflicting understand that at its close my forces required rest and reorganization.