Banks', or rather Canby's, army remained for some time at Morganza, a strongly fortified position, and occupied at this time by a large force. The Atchafalaya still affording sufficient water for the use of gun-boats, no operations could be undertaken across that stream. You say that I should have followed the movements of the enemy. This was simply impossible. The Nineteenth Army Corps was sen to New York or Washington. The portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, under A. J. Smith, were withdrawn to memphis, deployed, as I have said, for a few days by Marmaduke, while the Thirteenth Corps was dissolved by order of mr. Lincoln, thus leaving in Louisiana, so far as we could ascertain, the re-enlisted men of the Thirteenth Corps and the Corps d'Afrique. I should have mentioned that by a captured dispatch it was ascertained that the command of A. J. Smith received on April 5 orders to immediately join Sherman at Vicksburg. The operations of Taylor on Red River and Marmaduke on the Mississippi prevented Smith from executing this movement until the middle of June, or for a period of more than sixty days. I had not sufficient reason to believe that there remained a large force disposable for an attack on Mobile. How could I employ my command so as to attract a large force from either Sherman or Grant, or prevent a movement on Mobile? First, no demonstration could be made on New Orleans because of the Mississippi River. Any operations in the La Fourch country would necessarily he hazardous with the enemy t Morganza; would have been barren of military results; would have ravaged a country from which we should have been obliged to withdraw whenever the water rose. In the second place, if I had seized a point on the Mississippi River with a view of causing the enemy to send a large force to dislodge me the attempt would have failed unless I had guns sufficiently heavy to contend with iron-clads. had I had these my entire army would have been committed to their defense, and the ultimate result would probably have been a repetition of the Vicksburg and Port Hudson affairs. There remained a third plan, viz, to push a large cavalry force into Missouri and support he movement by occupying my infantry in operations against Steele. Should he waken himself to defend Saint Louis I might possibly take his works at Little Rock, Pine Bluff, and Devall's Bluff, and recover the State of Arkansas. If the proved too strong for me I would be at hand to help Price extricate himself in case of failure or disaster. This plan I was putting in execution, and had it not been for the telegrams* of Generals Bragg and Lee, herewith inclosed, my infantry would have been now in the Arkansas Valley and Price would have been entering Missouri.

I have written thus at length in advance of my report, delayed by being unable to get the reports of my subordinate commanders, because I learn that my policy and plans have been much discussed at Richmond, and that it has been charged that but for my errors much more important results would have been achieved. In this connection I have only to remark that I have honestly done what appeared to me to be right and proper. I claim that my combinations have resulted in great successes, and beg to doubt whether more could have been accomplished under a different system of operations. Certain it is that my heart overflowed with thankfulness when I realized the fact that the valor and good conduct of the officers and