that the moment the money is received paymasters will be sent to the army with it. Sherman has found the rebels intrenched in front of Marietta stronger than the expected. His assaulting column was driven back with a loss of about 3,000.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 28, 1864-8 a. m.

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT:

Your dispatch yesterday p. m., owing to the interruption of telegraphic communication, was not received by me until late last night. I have heard nothing from General Wilson, or of him, since his departure, except the reports of contrabands that the roads out of Petersburg have been cut. Unusual quiet prevailed along the lines yesterday. No indications of the movement of the enemy's cavalry to our left or rear could be ascertained. Reconnoitering parties, both of cavalry and infantry, reached the vicinity of the Weldong road, driving in the enemy's pickets to the road. No indications of any repairs to the road, but it was ascertained from negroes and others that wagon trains were passing between Petersburg and a point beyond Reams' Station, where Wilson cut the railroad. The order directing Brigadier-General Hunt to superintend the siege operations of the Eighteenth Corps, and requiring Colonel Abbot, in charge of siege train, to report to General Hunt, has been received, and a copy furnished General Hunt. Major-General Hancock has reported for duty and assumed command of the Second Corps.

GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

CITY POINT, VA., June 28, 1864.

Major-General MEADE,

Commanding, &c.:

I am now having a reconnaissance made to determine the practicability of forcing in between Petersburg and Richmond, either by the north bank of Swift Creek, or between Swift Creek and the Appomattox. If this proves practicable I will take for the execution of it the three left corps of your command, leaving the Eighteenth Corps, the cavalry, and one corps of the Army of the Potomac on the south side to defend what we now hold, and to be used as circumstances may require. If this move is made you will want to use all the road you can from your position to the crossing of the Appomattox. It will be advisable to make a night march without attracting the attention of the enemy, and to attack before they can re-enforce. The details, however, can be made after the adoption of the plan. If it should not prove practicable to operate with an army as here indicated, it is likely we will adopt the plan of taking the whole of the Army of the Potomac, with ten days' rations, and move around the enemy's right until the Appomattox is reached. We can then move on Petersburg from above or cross, as circumstances may prove to be most advantageous, and